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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, financial and political pressures have induced legisla-
tors to adopt forms of managed care for Medicaid programs. Rising health
care costs,1 the unpopularity of the Medicaid entitlement to both taxpayers
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I A multitude of factors have contributed to the dramatic increase in the cost of health
care in recent years, including technological advances, a much greater population of elderly
persons as the baby boom generation ages, and new diseases such as AIDS. See Laurel
Campbell, Health Care-Rising Costs of 7-10% Will Put Squeeze on Employers, COM.
APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Feb. 28, 1999, at J5, available in 1999 WL 4139175 (stating that
health care costs rose 3.7% nationwide in 1998 and forecasting a 7-10% rise in costs in 1999,
and citing "rising drug costs, an aging population and a proliferation of health care legislation
as factors"); Employers Expect Health-Care Costs to Rise 9 Percent in '99 Mercer Study Says,
ST. Louis Bus. J., Feb. 1, 1999, at 9, available in 1999 WL 8434004 (citing a survey con-
ducted by William M. Mercer Inc. which indicated that prescription drug costs rose 13.8% in
1998); Health Care Costs: At Rest or on the Rise?, FIN. EXECUTIVE, Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 8, 8
(quoting a benefits manager as saying that "'it's not a matter of if costs go up, but when');
Michael Prince, Health Care Costs on the Rise Again, Bus. INS., Dec. 21, 1998, at 24, avail-
able in 1998 WL 23211994 (explaining that prescription drug costs have skyrocketed "as
new, more-expensive drugs have hit the market and as consumers demand those drugs be-
cause of the influence of pharmaceutical industry advertising"); Julie Sneider, Health Care
Costs Rise with Demand for Information, Bus. J. (Milwaukee, Wis.), Nov. 7, 1997, at 1,
available in 1997 WL 16162789 (asserting that "the demand for outcomes measurements,
health care report cards and other quality initiatives is one reason employers may be paying
more for health care and health insurance this year and next"); Chris van Weel & Joop
Michels, Dying, Not Old Age, to Blame for Costs of Health Care, 350 LANCET 1159, 1159
(1997) (suggesting that the major increases in health care costs are a result of dying, not aging,
because "[the last period of life (any life, at any age) is usually marked, by definition, by ill-
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and state governments, 2 and shrinking budgets3 have made the move to
managed care all but unavoidable. As one commentator puts it: "In short,
rationing of health care is inevitable. ' 4 Given this reality, legislators and
courts are finding themselves in the difficult position of deciding between
the health care needs of the disabled and the financial demands of the vot-
ers, and consistently they are concluding that managed care is the only op-
tion.5 In the U.S. Congress, this has led to the explicit endorsement of man-
aged care for Medicaid under section 4701 of the Balanced Budget Act of
1997.6 In Pennsylvania, this has resulted in the development of "Health-
Choices," a program under which all Medicaid recipients will be mandato-
rily enrolled in managed care organizations ("MCOs") by 2000.' With this
ness that cannot be cured or controlled despite strenuous medical efforts"); All Things Consid-
ered: Health Inflation (NPR radio broadcast, Dec. 28, 1998), available in 1998 WL 3647721
(explaining that health care costs have risen for three decades and that the dramatic slowdown
in growth in spending between 1993 and 1997 is a result of the movement into managed care,
and forecasting double-digit rates of increase in the future).
2 See Ed Sparer, Gordian Knots: The Situation of Health Care Advocacy for the Poor
Today, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1, 3-4 (1981) (tracing the political resistance to Medicaid
expenditures since Medicaid's creation in 1969, and noting that although "[t]he large majority
of the poor and low-income people, in addition to working-class and lower-middle-class per-
sons generally, are excluded from Medicaid," they bear a disproportionate burden of the cost);
see also Richard Himelfarb, Book Review, 91 AM. POL. SC. REV. 734, 735 (1997) (review-
ing THE PROBLEM THAT WON'T Go AWAY: REFORMING U.S. HEALTH CARE FINANCING
(Henry J. Aaron ed., 1996)) (suggesting that President Clinton's proposed health care reform
plan failed as a result of "the public's increasing hostility toward big government and in-
creased taxes"). But see Glenn R. Pascall, Health-Care Debate About More than Rising
Costs, PUGET SOUND Bus. J., Apr. 25, 1997, at 11, available in 1997 WL 7329650 (reporting
that 81% of residents in the State of Washington "believe state government is not spending
enough on health care").
Recent efforts to reduce spending at every level of government have had a significant
impact on health care. See, e.g., John George, Cuts in Federal Spending Bode Increased
Pressure, PHILA. Bus. J., Jan. 2, 1998, at 24 (noting that "tough decisions about resource allo-
cations will again confront health-care executives" as health care funding decreases).
4 David Orentlicher, Destructuring Disability: Rationing of Health Care and Unfair Dis-
crimination Against the Sick, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 49, 49 (1996). Orentlicher also
notes that "we cannot afford all medically beneficial care.... Elimination of waste.., would
not free up enough resources to cover all potentially useful medical services." Id.
5 See Mary Crossley, Medicaid Managed Care and Disability Discrimination Issues, 65
TENN. L. REv. 419, 421 (1998) ("States hope that their Medicaid programs will enjoy the
same cost savings attributed to the growth of managed care in the private sector, and that
Medicaid recipients enrolled in a managed care plan will receive higher quality and more con-
sistent care.").
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(a)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 1998) ("[A state] may require an indi-
vidual who is eligible for medical assistance under [Medicaid] to enroll with a managed care
enti , as a condition of receiving such assistance .. ").
See Barnett Wright, Mandatory Managed Health Care Program for the Poor, PHILA.
TRw., Oct. 22, 1996, at 4E (describing the HealthChoices program and its implementation in
the five-county Philadelphia area); see also infra Part I.
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"inevitable" rationing, MCOs eventually will deny care to Medicaid patients
in many circumstances. This Comment explores the potential remedies that
those patients have available to them under the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 19908 (the "ADA" or the "Act") and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
9
Medicaid 0 funding has been the target of budget cuts almost since its
inception." Although the program has never been comprehensive, given
the large number of persons ineligible for Medicaid,12 one should not under-
estimate its importance to those who do receive assistance, particularly
those with disabilities. For instance, "between half and three-quarters of all
prescriptions for antiretrovirals are paid for by Medicaid or through state
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
9 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794e (1994).
10 Medicaid is a program that was established by Congress in 1965 to aid low-income
persons with health care costs. The program is jointly administered by the states and the fed-
eral government. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396. At the time, it was heralded as "the beginning of a
new era in medical care for low-income families, [with] its ultimate goal [being] the assurance
of complete, continuous, family-centered medical care of high quality to persons who are un-
able to pay for it themselves." Sparer, supra note 2, at 3 (quoting FEDERAL HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 5140 (Supp. D 1967)). Under Medicaid, millions of very poor Ameri-
cans receive care that would otherwise be unavailable to them. In 1995, more than 36 million
persons received health care services through Medicaid. See Overview of the Medicare and
Medicaid Programs, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Jan. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL
18242940.
The federal and state governments, however, abandoned this ideal of comprehensive care
for the poor long ago. As mentioned before, the program is jointly funded by the federal and
state governments, and by 1969, Congress was responding to state governments' complaints
about the financial burdens that the program imposed. The government has repeatedly cut the
program back since then, prompting one commentator to note in 1981 that "anti-poverty law-
yers engaged in health care litigation ... spend their time trying to stop things from getting
worse; ... they have abandoned efforts to make the program better .... ." Sparer, supra note
2, at 3. The Medicaid statute only requires that states provide services to the very poor, who
are defined as including recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") or
Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"), pregnant women and infants less than one year old
whose family income is at least 185% below the poverty level, children aged one to six years
who are 133% below the poverty level, and other children who are 100% below the poverty
level. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10), (l)(2) (1994).
Congress enacted Medicaid simultaneously with Medicare, which provides health care
assistance to the elderly, end-stage renal disease patients, and certain disabled persons. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ggg (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). This Comment focuses primarily on
Medicaid.
I See Sparer, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that Congress has been under pressure from state
governments to reduce Medicaid expenditures almost since the inception of the program).
12 See id. at 4 (listing those who are excluded from Medicaid, including "approximately
one third of the people officially defined as 'poor' by the federal government; a majority of
the people with incomes below the federal Bureau of Labor Statistics 'lower living level';
[and] the large majority of working-class Americans, many of whom cannot af-
ford... insurance").
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AIDS programs."'13 Nevertheless, "[ilt may be difficult for middle- and up-
per-class Americans to appreciate that poor people still die in the United
States because medical care is refused them."' 4 Many welfare advocates
fear that a move to managed care
15 will bring about exactly this result.
16
Although the benefits provided to Medicaid recipients have been
shrinking, the legal rights of disabled persons have expanded, especially
with the enactment of the ADA in 1990. Building on the ground broken by
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the ADA prohibits discrimination against
the disabled in the arenas of employment, public services, and public ac-
commodations.1 7 Recognizing the historical and continuing isolation and
segregation of persons with disabilities,18 and the potentially devastating
13 Susan H. McBride, The AIDS Cocktail, MANAGED HEALTHCARE, Nov. 1997, at 39.
14 Sparer, supra note 2, at 10 (detailing numerous stories of deaths resulting from lack of
medical assistance).
15 Managed care, in contrast to traditional fee-for-service insurance, places extensive
limits on both the doctors and services available to the patient. See generally Jane Bennett
Clark, A Doctor's-Eye View of Managed Care, KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN. MAG., June 1, 1997,
at 87, 88 (stating that the "simple" premise behind MCOs is that "[i]n exchange for either a
salary or a prepaid fee for every patient (called a capitated rate), doctors deliver routine and
preventive services and manage access to specialists-hence the term 'managed care"). Al-
though some doctors find the arrangement "equitable," others complain that "per-patient rates
barely pay for the basics." Id. at 88. Further, critics question the incentive structure, in which
MCOs allocate a lump sum to doctors, out of which the doctors themselves pay specialists
when their patients require specialized care--"a pretty horrible system that presents the po-
tential for huge conflicts of interest." Id. (internal quotations omitted). On the other hand, to
state governments facing seemingly insurmountable Medicaid expenses, managed care is an
attractive solution because MCOs "accept financial risk for the health care they sell." Sara
Rosenbaum et aL, Medicaid Managed Care and the Family Planning Free-Choice Exemption:
Beyond the Freedom to Choose, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1191, 1192 (1997).
16 See Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 51-52 (suggesting that the "rationing of health care"
will impact "who shall live and who shall die," and that "[i]n other cases, rationing can have
profound effects on a person's quality of life").
17 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12112 (1994) (prohibiting employment discrimination against
disabled persons); id. §§ 12131-12132 (prohibiting discrimination against disabled persons
with respect to access to public services); id. §§ 12181-12182 (prohibiting discrimination
against disabled persons with respect to public accommodations).
18 See id. § 12101(a) (discussing the discrimination that disabled Americans have histori-
cally faced, and that 43,000,000 disabled Americans continue to face today); see also Mark C.
Weber, Disability Discrimination by State and Local Government: The Relationship Between
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title 1I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1995) (observing that "[t]wo-thirds of [disabled] per-
sons ... who are old enough to work are not working; of that group, two-thirds want work,"
and that "[p]ersons with disabilities leave home to eat, view movies, or participate in public
events much less frequently than other members of the general population" (footnotes omit-
ted)).
MEANINGFUL ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE
"benign neglect" of the disabled that saturates American culture, 19 Congress
promulgated this broad-reaching statute.
With this expansion of rights on the one hand, and narrowing of bene-
fits on the other, a significant amount of litigation has begun to appear,
brought by patients challenging decisions made by state Medicaid agencies
or Medicaid MCOs under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. As one
commentator put it, "[s]ince its enactment, the ADA is already responsible
for a crippling case-load." 20 For Medicaid recipients, the relevant provi-
sions of the Act are Title II (public services)21 and Title III (public accom-
modations). 22 Under Title II, a state or local government and its instrumen-
talities cannot exclude from participation in a program or deny services to a
person with a disability.23 Under Title III, a public accommodation cannot
discriminate against a disabled person in the full and equal enjoyment of
goods and services of the accommodation. 24 Predictably, however, there are
a multitude of additional requirements and exceptions affecting whether a
state or MCO is responsible when it denies care. A "safe harbor" provision
in the ADA blocks suits against insurance companies under Title III, as long
as the insurer makes its risk assessment based on sound actuarial principles,
and not as a subterfuge to defeat the other purposes of the ADA.25 A num-
ber of courts have held that the public accommodations title applies only to
physical accommodations, and because most insured persons never actually
visit their insurance company's office, the insurance company does not fall
within that ambit.26 And most significantly, a Medicaid beneficiary can re-
cover for a denial of services only when he or she has been deprived of
19 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985) (observing that Congress enacted leg-
islation preceding the ADA to confront discrimination against the disabled that was "most
often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference-of
beniro neglect").
Matthew W. Daus, MediatingADA Claims, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 18, 1996, at Dl.
21 See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (prohibiting the exclusion of disabled persons from participa-
tion in public services by reason of their disability).
22 See id. § 12182 (prohibiting the denial of equal access to public accommodations).
23 See id. § 12131-12132 (prohibiting discrimination against disabled persons with re-
spect to access to public services and defining the term "public entity").
24 See id. § 12182(a) (providing that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation").
25 See id. § 12201(c) (stating that the Act "shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict"
insurers "from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks").
26 See infra Part III.B (discussing case law on the issue of whether insurance companies
are "public accommodations").
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"meaningful access" to that benefit.27 Not all restrictions on access to pub-
lic services and accommodations are actionable.
The issue of whether "meaningful access" to health care exists became
the crucial inquiry in determining whether a state agency had discriminated
against the disabled plaintiffs in Alexander v. Choate.28 This widely cited
case involved a challenge that Medicaid recipients brought against Tennes-
see's decision to reduce the yearly cap on reimbursed hospital days from
twenty to fourteen. In rejecting the plaintiffs' claim, the court cited three
relevant factors: the limitation did not "have a particular exclusionary ef-
fect" on the disabled, the reduction decision was not based on a standard
that the disabled were less capable of meeting, and "nothing in the record
suggest[ed] that the handicapped will be unable to benefit meaningfully
from the coverage they will receive under the 14-day rule." 29 Outside the
particular facts of Choate, however, it is uncertain what constitutes "mean-
ingful access," and as a result the federal courts have issued a wide spec-
trum of decisions. 30 Some courts have gone so far as to conclude that if a
recipient of a benefit has any access to the benefit, then that access is
meaningful.31 Other courts suggest a more detailed inquiry into the circum-
stances, examining whether the defendant has taken modest, affirmative
steps toward accommodation, 32 or even whether the access provided is ade-
quate.3 3
Given these conflicting interests, the question remains: When disabled
Medicaid managed care patients are denied care, what remedies are avail-
able to them under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act? This Comment
explores the potential causes of action a disabled Medicaid managed care
patient has under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act and whether a denial of
care, under recent federal court interpretations, constitutes a lack of mean-
ingful access. Part I looks at the problems presented by Medicaid managed
care and the HealthChoices program in Pennsylvania. Part II discusses the
stated purposes of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and whether the two
acts even contemplate such a suit. Part III explores the specific titles of the
27 See infra Parts IV-V (discussing the requirement that a plaintiff show a deprivation of
meaningful access in order to have an actionable claim, and the multitude of court opinions
interpreting "meaningful access").
H 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985) (holding that health benefits "cannot be defined in a way that
effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped individuals the meaningful access to which
they are entitled").
29 Id. at 302.
30 See infra Part V.A.
31 See infra Part V.A.1.
32 See infra Part V.A.3.
33 See infra Part V.A.7.
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ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and the potential suits that Medicaid pa-
tients could bring under each. Part IV analyzes Alexander v. Choate and the
establishment of the "meaningful access" test. Part V investigates recent
federal court rulings for interpretations of "meaningful access" in both the
health care arena and other contexts. Finally, Part VI argues for a more ex-
pansive reading of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, the abandonment of
numerous threshold barriers to bringing suit, and a more workable definition
of meaningful access in light of the goals of the ADA.
I. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED BY MCOs AND "HEALTHCHOICES"
At the same time that Congress has responded to demands for increas-
ing rights for the disabled, the government has been under increasing pres-
sure to reduce health care costs. Rising health care costs resulting from
technological advances, an aging population, and new diseases, combined
with the unpopularity of the Medicaid entitlement, have prompted both the
federal and state governments to adopt Medicaid managed care programs.
34
In Pennsylvania, this has resulted in the implementation of the "Health-
Choices" program for Medicaid recipients.3 5  Originally established as a
trial program, 540,000 Medicaid recipients in southeastern Pennsylvania
were required to choose one of four MCOs beginning on February 1,
1997.36 The program expanded to include the ten-county southwestern part
of the state on January 1, 1999,37 and the Pennsylvania Department of Pub-
lic Welfare (the "DPW") anticipates completing statewide enrollment in the
next two years. 3 One provision of the Medicaid statute requires that recipi-
ents have the ability to choose their physicians.39 Because MCOs typically
34 See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text (discussing the origins of managed care
programs).
35 See Wright, supra note 7, at 4E (providing an overview of HealthChoices). An analy-
sis of the different forms of Medicaid managed care programs in other states is beyond the
scope of this Comment, but for an overview, see Crossley, supra note 5, at 432-34.
36 See Pa. Delays HealthChoices Start-Up, MANAGED MEDICARE & MEDICAID, Dec. 16,
1996, available in 1996 WL 15558245.
37 See Peg Dumbaugh, Medical Aid Moves to Managed Care, PrrTSBURGH POST-
GAZETrE, Jan. 6, 1999, at N8, available in 1999 WL 5250461.
38 See Department of Public Welfare, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Statewide Man-
datory Medicaid Managed Care Expansion Discussion Paper, Dec. 1996 (last modified Jan.
22, 1997)<http://www.state.pa.us/PA Exec/PublicWelfare/mancare.pdf>.39
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) (1994) (mandating that a Medicaid program's enrollment
of a patient in a health system "shall not restrict the choice of the qualified person from whom
the individual may receive services").
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restrict care to doctors in their individual networks,4 ° in order to implement
HealthChoices, Pennsylvania had to obtain a waiver of this provision.
41
The implementation of HealthChoices in Pennsylvania has not been
smooth. For example, the reimbursement rates HealthChoices MCOs pay
for prescriptions to pharmacies are so low that two of the Philadelphia
area's largest chains, CVS and Eckerd, will not fill HealthChoices prescrip-
tions, and almost half of the independent pharmacies in the area have been
forced to close since the implementation of HealthChoices.42 Also, patients
in rural counties may be unable to see their primary care physicians, be-
cause some areas lack transportation for doctors in other counties, and there
is a dearth of doctors in outlying counties participating in particular MCO
plans.43  Further, there are problems with MCOs assigning non-English-
speaking patients to doctors who only speak English.
The main problem that managed care programs like HealthChoices pre-
sent, of course, is that in their mission to cut costs, they inevitably cut the
amount and quality of services, and this significantly affects the disabled.
Not only do MCOs give physicians a financial incentive to restrict the care
they provide,44 but MCOs themselves attempt to discourage enrollment of
persons with serious illnesses.45 The motivation for this is clear: "[A]1-
40 State-sponsored MCOs generally do not offer flexible "point-of-service" programs.
See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 15, at 1195 ("State Medicaid programs do not have the re-
sources to purchase 'point-of-service' products, which are more costly; furthermore, even if
such products were made available, Medicaid enrollees do not, as a general rule, have the re-
sources to make the higher copayments that such plan options demand of them.").
41 Under section 1915(b) of the Social Security Act, a state may request a "freedom of
choice waiver" from the Department of Health and Human Services in order to "mandate
beneficiary enrollment in managed care as a condition of coverage." Id. at 1193-94 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 1396n(b) (1994)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(b) (permitting waivers of the freedom
of choice of provider provision if the Secretary of Health and Human Services "finds it to be
cost-effective and efficient"); HCFA Ties Pa. Medicaid Waiver to Pledges on Chronic Care,
MANAGED CARE WK., Jan. 13, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9048249 (noting Pennsylvania's
receipt of the section 1915(b) freedom of choice waiver).
4 See Jeff Gelles, Pennsylvania Pharmacists Sue State over Medicaid Reimbursement
Rates, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRiB. Bus. NEws, Feb. 28, 1999, available in 1999 WL 12749318
(describing the difficulties that HealthChoices's low reimbursement rates have caused for in-
dependent pharmacists).
43 See Christopher Snowbeck, Rural Medicaid Recipients at Gravest Risk, Forum Told,
PriTSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Nov. 6, 1998, at B4, available in 1998 WL 14509481 (describ-
ing the problems that HealthChoices would create for rural patients).
4 Besides the pressure to reduce the amount of care, physicians report that managed care
has negatively impacted "clinical independence ... , the amount of paperwork required ... ,
the amount of time spent justifying clinical decisions ... and the patient-physician relation-
ship ... ." Taking Pulse of Profession, Public, AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 13, 1997, at 7.
The problem of improper incentives has not gone unnoticed by state legislatures. See
id. (observing a "flurry of anti-managed-care bills passed recently by legislatures across the
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though persons with disabilities make up only fifteen percent of Medicaid
beneficiaries, forty percent of Medicaid spending is attributable to that
group. '46 In a traditional managed care program, an insurer can contain its
costs by keeping patients healthy through preventative health care. This
strategy fails, however, when the patients have preexisting, chronic medical
needs.47 The role of the primary care physician as a "gatekeeper"--to limit
access to expensive, specialized care-is also incompatible with the treat-
ment of the disabled, because the disabled have greater need for specialists
than the general population.
48
HealthChoices has a particularly significant effect on persons with se-
vere disabilities such as AIDS, who often must leave their HIV-experienced
doctors to receive care from a doctor in the HealthChoices program.49 In
more rural areas, where there might not even be one HIV-experienced doc-
tor that is a member of a HealthChoices MCO, a person with AIDS could
face a life-threatening lack of care.
Two lawsuits recently filed .against the Pennsylvania DPW further il-
lustrate the limitations on care imposed by HealthChoices. In the first of
these cases, Anderson v. Department of Public Welfare, a group of Health-
Choices patients with mobility and visual impairments brought a class ac-
tion suit under the ADA.50 One of the Anderson plaintiffs was a wheel-
chair-bound Medicaid recipient whose HealthChoices MCO assigned him to
a dentist's office that was inaccessible to the physically impaired.51 Another
plaintiff in the suit challenged the failure of the HealthChoices MCOs to
nation"). Fortunately, the MCOs taking over state Medicaid programs do not generally have
the option of rejecting patients.
6 Crossley, supra note 5, at 426.
47 See id. at 427 (noting that the principle of cost containment through preventative health
care "is largely inapplicable to a population that includes many individuals with pre-
established, long-term medical needs").
48 See id. at 428 (observing that "many persons with disabilities or chronic conditions
have greater than average needs for specialist referrals").
Although it is almost a matter of common sense to consider AIDS as a disability, there
is also a plethora of case law in support of this proposition. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 118
S. Ct. 2196, 2204-07 (1998) (noting that "HIV infection satisfies the statutory and regulatory
definition of a physical impairment during every stage of the disease" and concluding that
even asymptomatic HIV can be a disability, given that it substantially limits the ability of a
person to reproduce); Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763, 774-75 (E.D.
Tex. 1996) ("Conditions such as AIDS [and] HV... have been determined by the courts to
beper se disabilities." (footnotes omitted)).
51 1 F. Supp. 2d 456,459 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
See id. at 459-60. The plaintiffs also faulted the DPW for failing to mandate that the
MCOs list in their directories any providers (other than primary care physicians) who were
accessible to the disabled. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment for Plaintiff at 2, 9-12, Anderson (No. 97-CV-3808).
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supply provider directories and member handbooks in Braille, large print, or
audiotape for the visually impaired . In ruling on the parties' cross motions
for summary judgment, the court concluded as a matter of law that for mo-
bility-impaired patients, the HealthChoices program "does not comply with
the minimum program accessibility regulations promulgated under Title II
and Section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act]. 5 3 The court declined to rule
on the claims of the visually impaired plaintiffs.5 4
The court also denied the DPW's cross-motion for summary judgment
in its entirety, which argued that the ADA cannot be used in cases of unin-
tentional discrimination.55 Although the DPW did not dispute Congress's
intent to provide for a disparate impact cause of action, the DPW asserted
that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in enacting the disparate
impact elements of the ADA. 56 The court specifically rejected these claims,
recognizing that the "ADA is a congruent and proportionate response to un-
constitutional discrimination against disabled individuals." ' In June 1998,
the parties reached a settlement agreement in which the DPW agreed to hire
an organization to evaluate all HealthChoices providers for their accessibil-
ity to the disabled, and based on the results of the study, the DPW would
ensure that the providers removed the barriers or the DPW would discon-
tinue the use of the provider.58 In addition, the DPW agreed to furnish pro-
vider directories and member handbooks in all three of the formats that the
plaintiffs requested, although the DPW could limit the directory by zip
code.
59
In another suit, Metts v. Houstoun, the plaintiffs alleged that the
HealthChoices HMOs failed to provide adequate notice for reductions or
denials of care. 60 Rather than receiving written notices explaining the rea-
52 The MCOs provided member handbooks in some of the alternative formats, depending
on the MCO, but not all three. None of the MCOs offered provider directories in any alterna-
tive format. See Anderson, I F. Supp.2d at 460; Memorandum of Law at 1, 13-16, Anderson
(No. 97-CV-3808).
3 Anderson, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 463. The court also required that HealthChoices MCOs
ensure that doctors' offices are accessible to the mobility impaired, with some exceptions for
smaller, older facilities, which could refer the patients to other caregivers. See id. at 462-65.
54 See id. at 466.
55 See id. at 467-69 (rejecting the defendant's challenges that Congress lacked the
authority to prohibit unintentional discrimination).
56 See id. at 467 ("Defendants argue that the ADA, when directed at unintentional dis-
crimination, is not 'appropriate legislation' within Congress' Section Five power...57 Id. at 468.
59 Telephone Interview with Robin Resnick, Esq., Disabilities Law Project (one of the
attorneys for the Anderson plaintiffs) (Mar. 10, 1999).
59 See id.
60 No. 97-CV-4123, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16737, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 1997).
Unlike Anderson, the plaintiffs in Metts brought the suit under the Due Process Clause of the
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sons for the reductions or denials and the process for appealing these deci-
sions, the plaintiffs received only oral notifications, perfunctory written no-
tifications, or no notice whatsoever.61 As a result, Medicaid recipients were
unaware that if they appealed the decision within ten days, they would still
be able to receive benefits, pending the outcome of the appeal. Even if they
were aware of their ability to appeal, without knowing the grounds for the
denials, they did not know what to argue.
Metts also brings to light another incompatibility between managed care
and care for the disabled. The plaintiffs in Metts challenged the Health-
Choices MCOs' practice of denying care for services that the MCOs
deemed "custodial"--that is, continual care for persons with chronic dis-
62abilities. The MCOs denied care to some Medicaid patients on the ground
that the patients' conditions would not improve with treatment, despite the
fact that treatment was needed just to maintain their conditions. 61 This is
not an uncommon practice among MCOs-often, "MCOs' definitions of
medical necessity.., focus on whether the service will improve or restore
function .... [and] is biased toward providing curative care, rather than
meeting the maintenance or developmental needs of many persons with dis-
abilities. ' '64
Another practice that the Metts plaintiffs challenged was HealthChoices
MCOs basing some of their decisions to deny care on general statistics,
rather than on an individualized determination of each patient's needs. If a
patient did not improve to the extent that someone with the patient's condi-
tion typically did, the MCO was apt to discontinue treatment.65
As in Anderson, the parties in Metts were eventually able to come to a
settlement; the DPW agreed to improve its notice system, to revise its crite-
ria for making coverage determinations, and to evaluate patients' needs on a
more individualized basis. 66 As long as the financial incentives exist for
Constitution and Title XIX of the Social Security Act. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Social
Security Act of 1965, tit. XIX, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 343 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). Once a state voluntarily chooses to partici-
pate in Medicaid, the state must comply with the requirements of Title XIX and the applicable
regulations. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980) ("Although participation in the
Medicaid program is entirely optional, once a State elects to participate, it must comply with
the requirements of Title XIX.").
61 See Mets, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16737, at *2-3.
62 Telephone Interview with Robin Resnick, supra note 58.
63 Id.
64 Crossley, supra note 5, at 429.
65 Telephone Interview with Robin Resnick, supra note 58.
66 Id.; see also HealthChoices SE News-June 1998 (last modified Oct. 30, 1998)
<http:/www.cilp.orgl-phlp/JUNSE98E.HTM> (summarizing important terms of the Melts
settlement).
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MCOs to limit care, however, new methods of limitation will likely arise,
and the need for legal remedies will persist.
These examples point to one simple conclusion: Managed care pro-
grams cause deficiencies in care for disabled persons. Perhaps tautologi-
cally, the pressure to reduce funding will result in less care, and thus, those
who will be the most greatly affected are the disabled. The question then
becomes what remedy the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act provides.
II. PURPOSES OF THE ADA AND THE REHABILITATION ACT
The stated purposes of the acts themselves serve as a relevant starting
point. The ADA purports to "provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with dis-
abilities., 67 The ADA is a much-needed remedy for persons with disabili-
ties, and it is a powerful remedy when blatant, malicious discrimination oc-
curs in the workplace, government services, or public accommodations.
68
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 partly to combat some of the deficien-
cies of its predecessor, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.69 The
Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against the disabled by organi-
zations receiving federal funding. Its mandate consists of a single sentence:
"No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance
.... ,70 Discrimination against disabled persons occurs in vastly broader
circumstances than these, however, and section 504 has been ineffectively
enforced by many government agencies charged with its enforcement. 71 As
a result, Congress recognized in the late 1980s that the Rehabilitation Act
was "inadequate to combat the pervasive problems of discrimination that
people with disabilities are facing."72  Congress proceeded to draft the
67 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
68 For instance, Congress specifically recognized the pervasiveness of discrimination
against persons with H1V and AIDS. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 31 (1990)
("[D]iscrimination against individuals with HIV infection is widespread and has serious re-
percussions for both the individual who experiences it and for this nation's efforts to control
the egidemic.").
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
70 Id.
71 See Kathleen S. v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 10 F. Supp. 2d 460, 467 (E.D. Pa.
1998) (noting the reasons that "section 504 did not achieve its purpose of ending disabilities-
based discrimination").
72 Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting S. REP. No. 101-116, at
18 (1989)) (internal quotations omitted).
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ADA, finally enacting it on July 26, 1990.73 Of particular import to Medi-
caid recipients is the fact that the ADA specifically addresses discrimination
in health care. "It makes no sense to bar discrimination against people with
disabilities in theaters, restaurants, or places of entertainment but not in re-
gard to such important things as doctor's offices."
74
The two acts are more comprehensive than this, however. In passing
these acts, Congress recognized that disabled individuals face not only dis-
crimination motivated by invidious intent, but also discrimination that has a
disparate impact on disabled persons. As a House of Representatives report
recognized: "Discrimination often results from false presumptions, gener-
alizations, misperceptions, patronizing attitudes, ignorance, irrational fears,
and pernicious mythologies." 75 The two acts contain provisions that spe-
cifically address this form of discrimination. The regulations implementing
the Rehabilitation Act, for instance, state that a recipient of federal funds
may not... utilize criteria or methods of administration (i) that have the effect
of subjecting qualified handicapped persons to discrimination on the basis of
handicap [or] (ii) that have the purpose or effect of defeating or substantially
impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the recipient's program with re-
spect to handicapped persons.
76
Similarly, the ADA prohibits "the imposition or application of eligibility
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or
any class of individuals with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying
any goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommoda-
tions." 77 Discrimination that is not motivated by animosity is still discrimi-
nation, and these provisions clearly attempt to reduce its effect.
Nevertheless, the acts cannot eliminate all discrimination, nor can they
guarantee that disabled persons will always receive the same result as the
nondisabled. As a House of Representatives report recognized: "'Full and
equal enjoyment' does not encompass the notion that persons with disabili-
73 In enacting the ADA, Congress specifically envisioned that it be implemented follow-
ing the standards of the Rehabilitation Act. "[N]othing in this chapter shall be construed to
apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under... the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 ... or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12201(a) (1994). Accordingly, courts have followed case law interpreting the Rehabilitation
Act when making rulings under the ADA. See, e.g., Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep't of
Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Mhe employment provisions of the [ADA]
merely generalize to the economy as a whole the duties ... that the regulations under the Re-
habilitation Act imposed on federal agencies and federal contractors."). Accordingly, this
Comment examines several cases that arise under the Rehabilitation Act.
74 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 35 (1990) (testimony of Robert Burgdorf, Jr.).
75 Id. at30.
76 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(4) (1998).
77 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i).
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ties must achieve the identical result or level of achievement of nondisabled
persons ... ,,78 The question remains where to draw the line, between pro-
hibiting all disparate impact discrimination and prohibiting only invidious
discrimination.
The courts have wrestled with this issue and have not reached a consen-
sus. For example, in Helen L. v. DiDario, the Third Circuit recognized that
[b]ecause the ADA evolved from an attempt to remedy the effects of "benign
neglect" resulting from the "invisibility" of the disabled, Congress could not
have intended to limit the Act's protections and prohibitions to circumstances
involving deliberate discrimination.... Rather, the ADA attempts to eliminate
the effects of that "benign neglect," "apathy," and "indifference."
79
In contrast, in DeBord v. Board of Education, the Eighth Circuit upheld a
regulation on the ground that "[t]he policy is neutral; it applies to all stu-
dents regardless of disability,"80 despite the fact that the regulation primarily
affected disabled students.
This Comment argues that courts should expand their recognition of
disparate impact claims in the Medicaid managed care context.81 Congress
recognized that "[t]he discriminatory nature of policies and practices that
exclude and segregate disabled people has been obscured by the unchal-
lenged equation of disability with incapacity and by the gloss of 'good in-
tentions.', 8 2  Upholding discriminatory, yet facially neutral, health care
regulations will only legitimate the gloss of good intentions.
III. CONSTRUCTION OF A SUIT UNDER THE ADA
OR THE REHABILITATION ACT
Given this fundamental conflict between the needs of persons with dis-
abilities and the move toward economizing health care, particularly Medi-
caid, the question remains regarding what remedies are available to disabled
78 H.R. RE-P. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 101.
79 46 F.3d 325, 335 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1483
(9th Cir. 1996) ("Congress intended to prohibit outright discrimination, as well as those forms
of discrimination which deny disabled persons public services disproportionately due to their
disability."); Weber, supra note 18, at 1118 (observing that under the ADA, "[p]rohibitions
extend to intentional discrimination as well as practices that have an unintended negative im-
pact on persons with disabilities" (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1), (3), (6)-(7))).
80 126 F.3d 1102, 1105 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1514 (1998); see also in-
fra notes 137-57 and accompanying text (discussing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287
(1985), and observing that the Supreme Court has not been receptive to disparate impact
claims in the health care context).
81 See infra Part VI.
82 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 41 (testimony of Arlene Mayerson, Disability Rights
Education and Defense Fund).
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persons who are denied care. For instance, HIV-positive patients depend on
the latest treatments in order to remain alive. An MCO, however, may de-
cide that the scientific community has not yet proven a new treatment to be
sufficiently "effective" or that a treatment is still too experimental to permit
reimbursement. Given the potentially life-extending benefits that a new
class of AIDS drugs could have, would any part of the ADA provide a cause
of action for these plaintiffs? This will depend, of course, on who the de-
fendants are. The patients potentially could sue either the state, as adminis-
trators of the Medicaid program, or the MCO, as the provider refusing to
give the care. Title II of the ADA applies to public services, namely state
and local governments and their departments, agencies, and instrumentali-
ties.s A suit against a state agency administering Medicaid benefits would
fall under Title II. A suit against an MCO, in contrast, could potentially fall
under Title II of the ADA (regarding public entities), Title III of the ADA
(regarding public accommodations), 4 or section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act (regarding the recipients of federal funding).85 Courts have construed
Title I of the ADA, which applies to employers, 86 to apply to MCOs in very
few cases.87
One initial threshold problem in bringing a suit against an MCO is the
ADA's "safe harbor" provision. According to section 501(c) of the ADA,
Titles I, II, and III are not meant to prohibit or restrict insurers from carrying
83 See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (1994) (defining "public entity").
94 See id. § 12181(7) (defining public accommodations to include, inter alia, restaurants,
bars, grocery stores, inns, terminals, and laundromats).
See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994) (indicating that no otherwise qualified person with a
disability shall be denied the benefits of any program or activity receiving federal assistance).
86 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4), (8) (defining terms such as "employee" and "qualified indi-
vidual with disability").
87 One commentator suggests that courts should consider MCOs to be employers because
employers are "covered entities" under the ADA and because the statute prohibits discrimina-
tion by 'an organization providing fringe benefits to an employee of a covered entity."'
David Manoogian, With Suits Mounting, Courts Face the Question of Whether a Managed
Care Organization Can Be an Employer Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, NAT'L
L.J., Mar. 17, 1997, at B6 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2)). Further, covered entities cannot
discriminate by 'participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship."' Id.
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 121112(b)(2)). Nevertheless, the case law in support of this proposition is
sparse. Compare Carparts Distributing Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n, 37 F.3d
12, 17 (1st Cir. 1994) (concluding that an "employer" is "any party who significantly affects
access of any individual to employment opportunities" (citation omitted)), with Pappas v.
Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n, 861 F. Supp. 616, 619 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (finding that an MCO is not
an "employer" under Title 1), and Dodd v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Assoc., 835 F. Supp.
888, 891-92 (E.D. Va. 1993) (granting an insurance company's motion for summary judgment
in a Title I ADA suit based on the court's conclusion that an insurance company is not a cov-
ered entity under the ADA).
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out traditional risk classification practices. 88 Under the strictest interpreta-
tion of this provision, some courts have held that insurance companies can-
not be sued under the ADA.8 9 On the other hand, an additional clause in
Title IV provides that the safe harbor provision "shall not be used as a sub-
terfuge to evade the purposes of subchapter I and III of this chapter.
' 90
Taken to an extreme, this provision appears to state that insurance compa-
nies will not be held liable for violating the ADA unless they actually at-
tempt to do so. The ambiguity of this section has been interpreted by the
Sixth Circuit as being "purposefully vague in order to satisfy contending
interest groups."91 With the exception of Title II cases, discussed below in
Part III.A, the safe harbor provision consequently has not proven itself to be
an effective bar to suits against insurance companies.
Part of the confusion arising from the safe harbor provision is the
meaning of the term "subterfuge." Although the ADA appears to permit
some degree of latitude for insurers to make risk assessments, it is uncertain
exactly where the line is drawn between valid risk assessment and invalid
subterfuge. Clearly, an insurer cannot completely deny health care to a per-
son with a disability on the basis of "risk assessment." As one court put it,
the safe harbor provision "does not apply to situations where an individual
with a disability has been totally denied coverage of any kind. 9 2 Beyond
this extreme, however, courts are in disagreement. In Conner v. Colony
Lake Lure, for instance, a district court placed a heavy burden on the plain-
tiff to prove that an insurance plan was a subterfuge.93 "[A] benefit plan
cannot be a 'subterfuge' unless the employer intended by virtue of the plan
to discriminate in a non-fringe-benefit-related aspect of the employment re-
lation." 94 In contrast, in Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, a district
court placed a "very heavy" burden on the insurer to prove that the insur-
88 See ADA § 501(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994) (listing what should not be prohibited
or restricted).
89 See, e.g., Attar v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 1997 WL 446439, at *12 (N.D. Tex.
July 19, 1997) (finding that insurance companies are protected from suit under the Title IV
safe harbor provision).
90 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c). Oddly enough, Congress did not apply the "subterfuge" excep-
tion to Title II, regarding public services, despite some indication in the congressional record
that Congress intended to do so. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 136 (1990).
91 Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 190 (6th Cir. 1996), vacated en
banc, 107 F.3d 359 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998).
92 Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763, 780 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
93 CIV. NO. 4:97CV01, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15938, at *1-2 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 4, 1997)
(dismissing a plaintiff's claim that her employer fired her after learning of her son's disability
in order to avoid paying his medical costs).
94 Id. at *27 (citing Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 166
(1989)).
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ance plan was not a subterfuge, and the court asserted that a specific show-
ing of intent was not necessary to demonstrate subterfuge. 95  "The term
subterfuge 'simply[] denote[s] a means of evading the purposes of the
ADA .... It does not mean that there must be some malicious intent to
evade the ADA on the part of the insurance company .... ,,,96 As a result,
the safe harbor provision predictably "has been the source of a lot of confu-
sion."
97
The unpredictable nature of the safe harbor provision makes a plain-
tiffs potential suit against a Medicaid MCO uncertain. If the plaintiff is in
a jurisdiction that construes the safe harbor provision so as to block Title II
suits against MCOs, she may want to abandon suing the MCO altogether
and sue the state instead. Each of the potential causes of action under the
different titles of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are dis-
cussed below.
A. Title I of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act:
Public Entities
A Medicaid recipient's ability to bring suit against the state under sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or Title II of the ADA perhaps presents
the greatest promise for success. In Helen L. v. DiDario, for instance, the
Third Circuit recognized a Title II suit against the Pennsylvania Department
of Public Welfare when the department required that the plaintiffs receive
care in a nursing home rather than in their own homes.98 One of the regula-
tions implementing the ADA requires that a public entity provide services
95 924 F. Supp. at 769-70, 779, 781 (finding that absent the defense of undue hardship, an
employer violated the ADA by switching from a high-premium health plan that covered an
HIV-positive employee to a low-premium health plan that excluded the employee, and as-
serting that "[t]he ADA puts the burden on those actors classifying risks to show both their
rationality and permissibility").
96 Id. at 780 n.53 (quoting Neville M. Bilimoria, No Relief in Sight: The Impact of the
Americans with Disabilities Act on AIDS Discrimination in Employee Medical Plans, 1994
DET. C.L. REv. 1053, 1080).
97 Id. at 779 n.50.
98 46 F.3d 325, 338 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[The] DPW can not rely upon a funding mechanism
of the General Assembly to justify administering its attendant care program in a manner that
discriminates and then argue that it can not comply with the ADA without fundamentally al-
tering its program.'); see also Kathleen S. v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 10 F. Supp. 2d 460,
469 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("There is no doubt that [the] DPW is a public entity subject to the re-
quirements of Title II."); Anderson v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 1 F. Supp. 2d 456, 463,
468 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (recognizing a Title II suit against the DPW and noting that Title II was a
valid exercise of the Fourteenth Amendment); cf Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, No. 95 CV
0641(SJ), 1996 WL 633382, at *4-6 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 1996) (recognizing a Title II suit
brought by Medicaid recipients with AIDS against the New York Division of AIDS Services
but expressing skepticism as to the plaintiffs' ultimate success on the merits).
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for a disabled person in the most integrated setting that is appropriate to her
needs.99 Because the DPW could have provided the disabled plaintiff with
care in her own home through an attendant care program, the Third Circuit
held that the DPW violated the ADA by requiring her to stay in a nursing
home.100 Similarly, in L.C. ex rel. Zimring v. Olmstead, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit found that psychiatric patients could challenge the state's refusal to
place them in an integrated setting under Title II, because "[t]he State's fail-
ure to place [the plaintiffs] in the community... [fell] squarely within the
ADA's ban on disability-based discrimination."10' A suit under Title II,
unlike those under Titles I and III, has the added advantage of not requiring
the exhaustion of administrative remedies. 10 2 As a result, a plaintiff is less
likely to run afoul of procedural problems with the state's administrative
appeals process and will potentially receive faster relief.
In addition, courts have held that the state itself cannot escape responsi-
bility just by delegating its authority. For instance, the District Court of
Arizona asserted that "[i]t is patently unreasonable to presume that Congress
would permit a state to disclaim federal responsibilities by contracting away
its obligations to a private entity."'
0 3
Although the state itself can be held liable, the question whether an
MCO with whom the state has contracted can be held responsible under the
Rehabilitation Act or Title II of the ADA is much less certain. An MCO
implementing a Medicaid program is arguably an "instrumentality" of the
state, which is specifically included in the definition of "public entity" in
99 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1998) ("A public entity shall administer services, programs,
and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals
with disabilities.").
1o0 Helen L., 46 F.3d at 327.
101 138 F.3d 893, 901 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 617 (1998). The Supreme
Court's decision to grant certiorari in Olmstead is troubling. The Court will consider whether
the ADA should not apply to state-provided services of long-term care. Should the Court
conclude that Title II does not apply to long-term care, Title II likely will become largely in-
applicable for disabled Medicaid recipients challenging denials of care. The Eleventh Circuit
concluded that Title II is clearly applicable, given the "overwhelming authority in the plain
language of Title II of the ADA, its legislative history, the Attorney General's Title II regula-
tions, and the Justice Department's consistent interpretation of those regulations . .. ." Id at
896. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will be similarly persuaded.
102 See Wagner v. Texas A & M Univ., 939 F. Supp. 1297, 1308 (S.D. Tex. 1996) ("Title
II adopts the 'the [sic] remedies, procedures and rights' as set forth in the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973[, which] ... 'does not require the exhaustion of administrative remedies."' (citations
omitted)).
103 J.K. v. Dillenberg, 836 F. Supp. 694, 699 (D. Ariz. 1993) (citations omitted).
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Title II.1 4 Very few courts have addressed this specific issue, and those
that have addressed the issue have dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. In
McDonald v. Massachusetts, for instance, the District Court of Massachu-
setts rejected the plaintiff's assertion that an insurance company was an in-
strumentality of the state. 05 The grounds for the dismissal, however, were
that the plaintiff had "set forth absolutely no underlying facts that would
support the allegation[] ... that [the insurance company] is an 'instrumen-
tality' of the Commonwealth.' 16  Given this rationale, it is uncertain
whether the outcome would have been the same had the plaintiff provided
more evidence. In another case, Rodriguez v. City of Aurora, the Northern
District Court of Illinois also denied the plaintiff's claims against an insurer
under the ADA's safe harbor provision.10 7 Because the "subterfuge" ex-
ception does not apply in Title II cases, the court concluded that all suits
against insurers were barred.10 8 The court acknowledged that the legislative
history supported the application of the subterfuge exception to Title II
cases, but because the plain terms of the statute do not include Title II, the
court dismissed the case. 10 9
One potential way to avoid the problem the safe harbor provision pres-
ents for Title II suits is to challenge an insurer's actions under section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act. Because Medicaid MCOs by definition receive fed-
eral funds, and the Rehabilitation Act applies to all federally funded pro-
grams and activities, an MCO could be responsible under the Rehabilitation
Act.10 Alternatively, the plaintiffs could sue under Title III of the ADA, as
discussed in the next Subpart.
104 See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (1994) ("The term 'public entity' means ... any depart-
ment, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local
government... ').
105 901 F. Supp. 471, 479 (D. Mass. 1995) (dismissing the plaintiff's claim for workers'
compensation benefits).
1o6 Id. at 478.
107 887 F. Supp. 162, 163 & n.1, 164 (N.D. I11. 1995) (dismissing the plaintiffs claim
against a city police pension fund, where the plaintiff had been excluded from the fund be-
cause of a spinal problem and an abstract thinking difficulty, despite being an able police offi-
cer).lo
108 See id. at 164 ("As is clear from the language of the statute .... the 'subterfuge' ex-
ception to the insurance exemption only applies to actions brought under subchapters I and 11I;
it does not apply to actions, like Rodriguez', brought under subchapter II*").
109 See id. ("Where [the statutory text] contains a phrase that is unambiguous... we do
not permit it to be expanded or contracted by the statements of individual legislators or com-
mittees during the course of the enactment process." (citations and internal quotations omit-
ted)).
110 See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (1994) (determining which programs and activities qualify as
federally funded programs).
1999] 1179
1180 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LA WREVIEW [Vol. 147:1161
B. Title III of the ADA: Public Accommodations
A plaintiffs ability to bring a suit against a managed care organization
under Title III of the ADA depends in large part on the court in which the
plaintiff brings the case. On the one hand, Title III of the ADA establishes
the broad mandate that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, fa-
cilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation .... 111 The House Reports accompanying the ADA assert
that the purpose of Title III is "to bring individuals with disabilities into the
economic and social mainstream of American life.... in a clear, balanced,
and reasonable manner."'1 2 Given this mandate and intention, it follows
that a disabled individual should be able to challenge discriminatory prac-
tices of insurance companies that keep her out of the economic and social
mainstream. On the other hand, several courts have been unwilling to inter-
pret "public accommodation" to include insurance companies. Currently,
the First Circuit is the only federal court of appeals that has accepted this
interpretation.
In Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass 'n,
the First Circuit reversed a district court's dismissal of a suit against a health
plan.113 The suit challenged the health plan's lifetime cap on benefits for
persons with AIDS.! 4 The court rejected both the district court's view that
a "public accommodation" must be a physical structure and the argument
that because patients dealing with insurance companies typically did so over
the phone, insurance companies were not public accommodations." 5 In-
stead, the court reasoned that the terms of Title III itself did not require
physical structures, and that the example of "travel service" among Title
III's list of accommodations indicated that Congress contemplated non-
physical structures. "It would be irrational to conclude that persons who
enter an office to purchase services are protected by the ADA, but persons
who purchase the same services over the telephone or by mail are not.
Congress could not have intended such an absurd result."'
1 6
11 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
112 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 99 (1990).
113 37 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 1994).
114 See id. at 14 (discussing challenges to the validity of a $25,000 lifetime benefits cap
for AIDS-related illnesses).
15 See id. at 19 (holding that establishments of "public accommodation" are not "limited
to actual physical structures").
116 Id.
To exclude this broad category of businesses from the reach of Title III and limit the
application of Title III to physical structures which persons must enter to obtain
goods and services would run afoul of the purposes of the ADA and would severely
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Nevertheless, numerous courts have reached just that result. In Pappas
v. Bethesda Hospital Ass'n, for example, an employee brought suit under
Title III against a hospital association after she was denied health coverage
for her family1 17 The court rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the hospi-
tal association fell under Title III, reasoning that "the references throughout
Title III make it clear that its scope is limited to discrimination in the provi-
sions of goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommoda-
tions based on a disabled person's physical ability to make use of those
goods, services, etc." 118 The court also rejected the Department of Justice's
interpretation of the statute, which suggested that the discriminatory sale of
insurance contracts falls under Title III, on the grounds that the Department
of Justice opinion was only suggestive authority.1 19 Instead, given the lack
of case law on the subject, the court reasoned that it must construe the terms
of the ADA narrowly--"based on the 'ordinary, common meaning of the
words in the statute."' 120  The court concluded that the most ordinary
meaning of "public accommodation" is a physical location.
121
The Sixth Circuit initially followed Carparts in Parker v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. ("Parker 1"), concluding that because Title III covered
"goods" and "services," a person did not have to enter a structure in order to
use a public accommodation.122 The Sixth Circuit, however, later reversed
the opinion en banc ("Parker I1") on the grounds that "[a] benefit plan of-
fered by an employer is not a good offered by a place of public accommo-
dation."123 Because Parker obtained her benefits from her employer, rather
than seeking out an insurance office on her own, there was no "nexus" to a
frustrate Congress's intent that individuals with disabilities fully enjoy the goods,
services, privileges and advantages, available indiscriminately to other members of
the general public.
Id. at 20.
117 861 F. Supp. 616, 617 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (noting that the defendant refused to provide
health care to both the plaintiff's husband, who had hypertension and hyperlipidemia, and to
the plaintiff's son, who was a paraplegic confined to a wheelchair).
Ila Id. at 620.
119 See id. (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 600 (1993)).
120 Id. (quoting United States v. Ransbottom, 914 F.2d 743, 745 (6th Cir. 1990)).
121 See id. (noting that all the examples of public accommodations in the statute "are
'places' within the plain meaning of that word").
12 99 F.3d 181, 188 (6th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Parker 1] ("[Plantiff argues that the
plain meaning of these [ADA] provisions covers 'insurance products,' because insurance
products are 'goods' or 'services' provided by a 'person' who owns a 'public accommoda-
tion.' We agree."), rev'den bane, 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Parker II.
123 Parker11, 121 F.3d at 1010.
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physical place, hence no public accommodation. 24  The Parker II court
construed the ADA narrowly, reasoning that it was bound to such an inter-
pretation under the doctrine noscitur a sociis, u12  which directs that
"a... term is interpreted within the context of the accompanying words to
avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress."
126
This "narrow" reading of the ADA is in direct contrast to the Parker I
court's finding that because the ADA is a remedial statute, its terms should
be "interpreted broadly, in a manner consistent with their stated goal.' 27
Some courts have reached the same conclusion as the Parker I court, how-
ever, reasoning that "[u]nlike other legislation designed to settle narrow is-
sues of law, the ADA has a comprehensive reach and should be interpreted
with this goal in mind. 128 Under this broader reading, in Baker v. Hartford
Life Insurance Co., a district court asserted that "the ADA does not require
a plaintiff to be physically present at the place of public accommodation to
be entitled to non-discriminatory treatment." 129  A child brought suit in
Baker against an insurance company when it refused to cover him because
he suffered from a seizure disorder. 30 In denying the defendant's motion
for dismissal, the court observed that "discrimination can occur... when a
plaintiff is not physically present at the place of public accommodation and
only has contact with that place ... by telephone and correspondence."1
3'
Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
faced this issue in Kotev v. First Colony Life Insurance Co., and reading all
of the previous interpretations of the statute, concluded that Title III does
apply to insurance companies. 32 In Kotev, a life insurance applicant sued a
life insurance company that refused to insure him because his wife was
HIV-positive, though he himself was HIV-negative. The Kotev court raised
124 See id. at 1011. The requirement of a "nexus" to a physical location was also raised
by the Pappas court. See Pappas, 861 F. Supp. at 620 ("[T]here is no nexus whatsoever be-
tween the alleged discrimination and any public accommodation.").
125 Noscitur a sociis is a doctrine where "the meaning of questionable or doubtful words
or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or
phrases associated with it." BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 1060 (6th ed. 1990).
126 ParkerlI, 121 F.3d at 1014 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
127 Parker I, 99 F.3d at 188 (citation omitted). "[W]e are bound to interpret statutory
language in such a way as to avoid rendering terms superfluous.... To say that the Disabili-
ties Act prohibits discrimination only as to 'physical access' to places of 'public accommoda-
tion' would write the terms 'goods' and 'services' out of the statute." Id. (citation omitted).
128 Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763, 771 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
129 No. 94 C 4416, 1995 WL 573430, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1995).
130 See id. at * 1.
131 Id. at *3.
132 927 F. Supp. 1316, 1321 (C.D. Cal. 1996) ("ITihe plain language of Title
III... demonstrates that Title III is not limited to prohibiting only the denial of physical ac-
cess to persons with disabilities.").
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perhaps the clearest reason to permit a suit against an insurance company
under Title III: insurance companies would not need the safe harbor provi-
sion under Title III if the Title was inapplicable to insurance companies.
133
Further, the court asserted that even under the "narrow" readings of the
ADA, which the courts in Parker 11 and Pappas espoused, the plain lan-
guage of the ADA simply does not mandate that only physical accommoda-
tions are covered. Given the broad-ranging purposes of the ADA to end
"discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities," it would make
little sense to remove such a large portion of the discrimination from the
scope of the ADA. 134 Further, because the ADA protects not only the dis-
abled, but also those with a record of a disability and those who are per-
ceived as disabled, Title III would have little meaning for these groups if it
applied only to physical places.
135
The issue of the applicability of Title III to insurance companies is still
unsettled, but two subsequent cases have followed Kotev,136 increasing the
possibility that the Pappas and Parker II opinions will eventually lose their
authority.
IV. ALEXANDER V. CHOATE AND "MEANINGFUL ACCESS"
The main obstacle to using the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act to chal-
lenge a state or managed care organization's limitation on Medicaid benefits
is a 1985 Supreme Court case, Alexander v. Choate.137 In Choate, disabled
Medicaid recipients challenged a reduction in the maximum annual hospital
days that the State of Tennessee would reimburse. The state reduced the
number of annual inpatient hospital days for which Medicaid would pay
hospitals from twenty to fourteen. 138 The plaintiffs argued that this policy
change had a disproportionate effect on the disabled, in violation of, among
133 See id. at 1322 ("First Colony has not explained why insurers would need this 'safe
harbor' provision under Title III if insurers could never be liable under Title III for conduct
such as the discriminatory denial of insurance coverage.").
134 See id. at 1321 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (1994)).
135 See id. at 1321-22 (asserting that the plain language of the law cannot support such a
restrictive interpretation).
136 See World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203, 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (concluding,
in a challenge to a health insurer's $5000 lifetime cap on AIDS benefits, that "Title III's scope
extends beyond the mere denial of physical access to places of public accommodation" (cita-
tion omitted)); Cloutier v. Prudential Ins. Co., 964 F. Supp. 299, 302 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing
Kotev for the conclusion that the plaintiff could sue an insurance company under Title III
when it denied his application for life insurance because his partner was HI V-positive).
137 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
138 See id. at 289 & n.2 (discussing the proposed 14-day limitation on inpatient coverage
and other cost-saving changes that the state proposed to its Medicaid program).
1999] 1183
1184 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 147:1161
other things, the Rehabilitation Act. 139 The Court recognized the problem
of noninvidious discrimination against the disabled, and stated that "much
of the conduct that Congress sought to alter in passing the Rehabilitation
Act would be difficult if not impossible to reach were the Act construed to
proscribe only conduct fueled by a discriminatory intent.' '140 Nevertheless,
the Court, when balancing the medical needs of the disabled with the finan-
cial burdens of the state, found that the cap on hospital inpatient days did
not violate the Rehabilitation Act. 141 The decisive element in the balancing
test, according to the Court, was that the plaintiffs were not deprived of
"meaningful access."'142
The establishment of a "meaningful access" analysis is the crucial ele-
ment of the Choate opinion. In its attempt to balance the needs of the state
against the needs of the plaintiffs, the Court asserted that the existence or
lack of meaningful access was the relevant inquiry, although neither this
standard nor this terminology appears in the Rehabilitation Act itself. "[A]n
otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be provided with meaning-
ful access to the benefit that the grantee offers.... [T]o assure meaningful
access, reasonable accommodations in the grantee's program or benefit may
have to be made."'143 In finding that the plaintiffs had meaningful access to
health care, the Court cited three relevant factors: first, the fourteen-day
limitation did not "invoke criteria that have a particular exclusionary effect"
on the disabled; second, the cap was "neutral on its face," because it did not
base the determination of who would be covered on any test that the dis-
abled were less capable of meeting; and third, "nothing in the record sug-
gest[ed] that the handicapped... [would] be unable to benefit meaningfully
from the coverage they [would] receive under the 14-day rule."'
144
The lack of a "particular exclusionary effect" that the Court referred to
was the district court's finding that 95% of the disabled plaintiffs on Medi-
139 See id. at 290.
140 Id. at 296-97. "Discrimination against the handicapped was perceived by Congress to
be most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indiffer-
ence-of benign neglect." Id. at 295; see also supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Congress's recognition, in its enactment of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, of
disparate impact discrimination against the disabled).
141 See Choate, 469 U.S. at 300 (asserting that the appropriate inquiry is a balancing test
"between the statutory rights of the handicapped to be integrated into society and the legiti-
mate interests of federal grantees in preserving the integrity of their programs," and explaining
that "while a grantee need not be required to make 'fundamental' or 'substantial' modifica-
tions to accommodate the handicapped, it may be required to make 'reasonable' ones").
142 Id. at 301.
143 Id. at 301.
144 Id. at 302.
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caid probably would be covered fully under the fourteen-day plan.145 Yet,
the record also contained data suggesting that in a recent year, 27% of the
disabled patients using inpatient services needed more than fourteen days of
care, while only 8% of the nondisabled that required hospitalization needed
more than fourteen days.146 That is, disabled hospital patients were more
than three times as likely to be affected by the reduction in care than the
nondisabled hospital patients. A finding of whether there is an "exclusion-
ary effect" may therefore depend upon which statistics a court uses in its
analysis. At any rate, all that one can glean from this particular part of the
analysis is that when only 5% of a group of plaintiffs are affected by a
regulation, the exclusionary effect may be insufficient to constitute a lack of
meaningful access.
The Court's examination of the "facial neutrality" of the regulation is
troublesome, because the plaintiffs brought the suit as a disparate impact
cause of action. 147 That is, the plaintiffs recognized that there was no in-
vidious provision in the regulation that singled out the disabled, but alleged
that its disparate effect on them produced an actionable claim. The Court
initially recognized that facially neutral regulations could have a disparate
impact on the disabled. 148 Given that a per se rule against disparate impact
discrimination "could lead to a wholly unwieldy administrative and adjudi-
cative burden," however, the Court reasoned that some limit would have to
be imposed.149 As a result, the Court concluded that only "conduct that has
an unjustifiable disparate impact upon the handicapped" constitutes a viola-
tion of the Rehabilitation Act. 15 In order to determine whether there is an
"unjustifiable disparate impact," the relevant inquiry is whether "the reduc-
tion, neutral on its face, . . . distinguish[es] between those whose coverage
will be reduced and those whose coverage will not on the basis of any" clas-
sification based on disability. 15  Put simply, a facially neutral regulation is
justifiable if it is facially neutral. This tautology has not helped the lower
145 See id. at 303.
146 See id. at 289-90.
147 See Choate, 469 U.S. at 289 (noting that the plaintiffs alleged that the regulations
would have a "discriminatory effect on the handicapped"); see also supra notes 75-82 and
accompanying text (discussing disparate impact).
14 See Choate, 469 U.S. at 295-97 (describing how actions that lack a discriminatory
intent may nonetheless have an inadvertent discriminatory result).149 Id. at 298.
150 Id. at 299 (emphasis added). The Court "assumed" rather than "decided" this inter-
pretation of the law. See id. ("[W]e assume without deciding that § 504 reaches at least some
conduct that has a unjustifiable disparate impact upon the handicapped.").
151 Id. at 302 (emphasis added).
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courts to produce consistent decisions, and some have gone so far as to find
that meaningful access exists when a regulation is facially neutral.152
The Court's reasoning that nothing in the record suggested that the
plaintiffs would not "benefit meaningfully" is also a bit problematic, be-
cause the term "meaningful" is used to explain the term "meaningful.'
153
This factor does suggest that a plaintiff must have a strong evidentiary
showing of a deprivation of access to succeed. Many lower courts, perhaps
because of this ground for the decision, have held that unless there is a total
deprivation of a benefit, a plaintiff still has meaningful access.
1 54
From the facts of Choate, it is clear that when 95% of beneficiaries
have access to a program, and the regulation does not specifically single out
a protected group, meaningful access exists.' 55  Outside these particular
facts, however, courts have resolved the question of the definition of
"meaningful access" inconsistently. Given the circular reasoning in the
Court's analysis, the three elements of the meaningful access analysis are
virtually impossible to apply to other circumstances. Some courts have
based their analyses on whether the challenged policy is facially neutral.
156
Others have examined whether the challenged policy results in a particular
exclusionary effect.157  But for the majority of lower court decisions, the
determination whether "meaningful access" exists is at the judge's discre-
tion. The next Part explores the many different interpretations that courts
have expounded.
V. WHAT CONSTITUTES MEANINGFUL ACCESS?
The question regarding what constitutes meaningful access to health
care under the ADA has not been resolved in the lower courts. The case law
addressing the issue is not overly extensive because the ADA took full ef-
152 See infra Part V (discussing the spectrum of decisions on meaningful access for the
disabled).
153 See Choate, 496 U.S. at 302 (explaining that a patient would not have "meaningful
access" if he were "unable to benefit meaningfully from the coverage").
154 See infra Part V.A.I, for a discussion of cases interpreting "meaningful access" in this
way.5
155 Despite some subsequent expansions of the Choate holding, this aspect of Choate re-
mains firm: A blanket restriction on the amount of funds expended on health care does not
constitute a denial of meaningful access. For instance, in Modderno v. King, the D.C. Circuit
held that a $75,000 lifetime maximum on mental health benefits for Foreign Service Benefit
Plan recipients still provided meaningful access. See 82 F.3d 1059, 1062 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
("A $75,000 lifetime maximum would... surely satisfy [Choate]'s requirement that the dis-
abled benefit meaningfully from the coverage they will receive." (internal quotations omit-
ted)).
156 See infra Part V.B.2.
157 See infra Part V.A.5.
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fect only in 1992. Moreover, early cases interpreting the Rehabilitation Act
construed it narrowly, thereby discouraging subsequent suits. 58 The fol-
lowing Subpart examines the district court decisions that address the issue
of meaningful access and attempts to position them on a spectrum between
the extremes of "any access" and "adequate access." The second Subpart
discusses some of the ways that courts, recognizing the ambiguous state of
the law, have attempted to avoid the question altogether.
A. The Spectrum of Decisions on MeaningfulAccess for Disabled Persons
The lack of a more specific holding in Choate has resulted in a series of
district court opinions in substantial disarray. Recall that the Court in Alex-
ander v. Choate cited three factors in its determination of meaningful ac-
cess: (1) whether the challenged regulation had a particular exclusionary
effect on the disabled; (2) whether the regulation was neutral on its face;
and (3) whether anything suggested that the disabled would be unable to
benefit meaningfully.1 59 Courts occasionally have cited the first factor, but
given that one cannot discern from Choate how much of an exclusionary
effect is necessary to have a deprivation of meaningful access, the first fac-
tor is not particularly illuminating. The second factor is problematic be-
cause, as discussed earlier, when a plaintiff alleges that noninvidious, dispa-
rate impact discrimination has taken place, one would expect the regulation
to be facially neutral. The third factor is clearly circular and provides no
guidance. As a result, district courts have produced a variety of opinions.
The holding of Choate, that a state is not required to provide "adequate
health care," 160 remains good law. As a result, many courts have construed
"meaningful access" to mean any access. That is, if a recipient receives any
benefit whatsoever, the access is meaningful. Under this analysis, a court
could conclude that a Medicaid recipient had "meaningful access" just by
receiving Medicaid. Some courts have backed away from this absolutist
approach, however, and have found violations of meaningful access in
situations ranging from when a benefit is "effectively unavailable" to when
access is "difficult or extremely inadequate," and even just "inadequate,"
potentially conflicting with Choate.
158 See Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 58 (noting that the narrow interpretation of the Reha-
bilitation Act by federal appellate courts could have discouraged later claims).
159 See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 302 (1985); supra Part IV (discussing the
Supreme Court's decision in Choate and its establishment of the "meaningful access" analy-
sis).16 o10Choate, 469 U.S. at 303.
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1. Meaningful Access as Any Access
At the far end of the spectrum are several holdings that suggest that
there must be a total deprivation of access before meaningful access is com-
promised. In Frances J. v. Bradley, for instance, a district court found no
violation of the Rehabilitation Act when the State declined to fund home
care for mentally disabled elderly plaintiffs. 161 Instead, the plaintiffs re-
ceived care at a facility. Reasoning that the plaintiffs were "not being ab-
solutely excluded from the program," the court found that they were "not
being deprived of meaningful access to these benefits." 162 The Eleventh
Circuit took a similar approach, but found for the plaintiffs, in United States
v. Board of Trustees for the University ofAlabama.163 In that case, the court
found that when the University of Alabama refused to provide sign lan-
guage interpreters for its deaf students, the students were deprived of
meaningful access under the Rehabilitation Act. 164 "In the case of a deaf
student,... all access to the benefit of some courses is eliminated when no
sign-language interpreter is present." 65 Since total lack of access is not
meaningful access, the court held that the University was in violation of the
Rehabilitation Act.
Carried to its extreme, the absolutist approach can have some troubling
results. In Slager v. Duncan, for instance, the plaintiff sued the county in
which he lived under the ADA, seeking an injunction to block the installa-
tion of speed bumps his street.166 The plaintiff suffered from a spinal injury
that made driving over speed bumps very painful. Nevertheless, reasoning
that the bumps "do not totally bar his use of the roads or leave him entirely
'unable to benefit meaningfully' from the streets .... he has not been denied
'meaningful access."' 167 Thus, even though the "access" caused the plain-
tiff severe pain, painful access is still "meaningful."
161 No. 92C5190, 1992 WVL 390875, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 1992) (mem.).
162 Id. at *7.
163 908 F.2d 740 (1lth Cir. 1990).
164 See id. at 748.
165 Id. The court went on to explain that "[i]n the context of a discussion class held on
the third floor of a building without elevators, a deaf student with no interpreter is as effec-
tivel, denied meaningful access to the class as is a wheelchair bound student." Id.
"" No. AW-97-1598, 1997 WL 715033, at *1 (D. Md. Aug. 5, 1997), afd, 162 F.3d
1155, No. 97-2301, 1998 WL 558764 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision).
167 Id. at *2.
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2. The Extreme Approach, but with Recognition of
the Need for Effective Treatment
In another case, a district court also took an absolutist approach, but ex-
pressed some hesitation in using such a strict definition. In Concerned Par-
ents to Save Dreher Park Center v. City of West Palm Beach, parents of dis-
abled persons sued after the city chose to terminate recreational programs
for the disabled.168 In the wake of budget cuts, the city completely elimi-
nated the programs for disabled persons, but continued numerous programs
for the general population. 169 Recognizing that a complete absence of ac-
cess was a deprivation of meaningful access, the court found that the city
violated the ADA.170 The court also recognized that the city did not have to
provide services to anyone, but that if it provided programs for the general
population, it had to make provisions for the disabled.1
7'
The difference between this case and the other absolutist cases cited is
that this court recognized that sometimes different or separate benefits must
be provided in order to have the same effect. "[T]he ADA contemplates
that different or separate benefits or services be provided if they are 'neces-
sary to provide qualified individuals with disabilities with aids, benefits, or
services that are as effective as those provided to others." '17 2 That is, the
court implicitly suggested that there might be a deprivation of meaningful
access when a regulation does not provide services that are as effective as
those provided to the general population. "Ineffective" is closely related to
"inadequate," which the Choate court rejected as a determination of mean-
ingful access. The Concerned Parents court also specifically stated, how-
ever, that "adequate" recreational programs were not required under the
ADA, 173 and took the absolutist approach in its holding.
168 846 F. Supp. 986, 988 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
169 See id. at 989.
170 See id. at 992 ("When these programs were eliminated, Plaintiffs were denied the
benefits of the City's leisure services in contravention of Title II.").
171 See id. at 990 n.11 ("mhe ADA does not require that persons with disabilities be
given 'adequate recreational programs' or, for that matter, any recreational programs. How-
ever, the ADA does require that persons with disabilities be given equal access to whatever
benefits the City offers to persons without disabilities." (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S.
287,303 (1985))).
172 Id. at 991 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv) (1993)).
173 See id. at 990 n.11 ("[Tihe ADA does not require that persons with disabilities be
given 'adequate recreational programs' or... any recreational programs.").
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3. Meaningful Access as Requiring Modest, Affirmative Steps toward
Accommodation
Moving away from the extreme, two federal district courts have sug-
gested that plaintiffs lack meaningful access to health care when the State
has not considered their needs in establishing its regulations. This techni-
cally does not help one reach a clearer definition of "meaningful access,"
because the inquiry inappropriately revolves around what the caregiver pro-
vides, rather than what the patient receives. Nonetheless, some courts have
focused on the caregiver's actions to make their determination on meaning-
ful access. In Marisol A. v. Giuliani, children under the care of the New
York City Administration for Children's Services sued the city for placing
the children in group homes that were not equipped to deal with the chil-
dren's medical problems.174 The court denied the defendant's motion to
dismiss, asserting that "a court may require an agency, under certain cir-
cumstances, to take affirmative steps to ensure that the access is meaning-
ful.' 7 5 The state placed two particular children, one with HIV and the other
with neurological problems, in homes that lacked the medical staffs neces-
sary to treat their conditions properly.176 As a result, even though the chil-
dren were receiving some care, the court did not deem it to be meaningful.
Similarly, in Henrietta D. v. Giuliani,177 disabled persons with HIV and
AIDS sued the city of New York because the Division of AIDS Services
(the "DAS") provided benefits only after substantial delays and with con-
siderable inconvenience to the recipients. 78 For instance, the plaintiffs had
to travel long distances to receive benefits, "standing in line for long periods
of time[, which] may be both painful and, more significantly, may expose
them to infections which healthy people may not even notice, but which
may prove deadly for them."' 79 Rejecting the city's claim that the existence
of the DAS program itself was "meaningful access," the court found that the
Rehabilitation Act "requires some degree of positive effort and at least
modest, affirmative steps to accommodate the handicapped.', 8 0 Depending
on the plaintiffs' conditions, the court reasoned that the city might have to
174 929 F. Supp. 662, 669-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
175 Id. at 685.
176 See id.
177 No. 95-CV0641-SJ, 1996 WL 633382, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 1996).
178 See id. at *2 (describing the plaintiffs' claims in detail).
179 Id. at *8.
ISO Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 652,
653 n.6 (2d Cir. 1982)); see also id. at *9 ("Given plaintiffs' disability and, in particular, the
ease with which even minor infections can profoundly threaten their health, it is clear that de-
fendants must provide Food Stamps, Home Relief, and other public assistance benefits in
some modified fashion to these plaintiffs.").
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make adjustments to its program-that the plaintiffs received some benefits,
or that the city imposed delays on all Medicaid recipients alike, could not
justify the delays.
Nevertheless, the Henrietta D. court was skeptical of the plaintiffs' ul-
timate success in proving a lack of meaningful access. Although the court
recognized the potentially life-threatening problems with the policies of the
DAS, the court also found that the DAS attempted to expedite the claims of
some plaintiffs, provided cash supplements unavailable to persons without
HIV, and required fewer visits to the city welfare offices.181 As a result, the
court found that "plaintiffs are not likely to succeed in proving that
DAS ... does not or will not... [provide] beneficiaries [with] meaningful
and equal access .... ,,182 Thus, despite its recognition of an affirmative
obligation to accommodate special needs, the court appeared to indicate that
meaningful access exists when the state has made modest affirmative steps
at accommodation, even if those steps are inadequate. Because the court
was ruling only on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted, however, the court denied the defendants'
motion.
183
4. Meaningful Access as Readily Accessible
Beyond the absolutist and individualized inquiry standards, the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania has suggested a "readily accessible" standard for
determining whether there is meaningful access. In Peoples v. Nix, a blind
attorney challenged Rule 120 of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia, which
required a party to appear in court to obtain a default judgment even when
the other party failed to appear.184 The court recognized the ambiguity in
the definition of "meaningful access," examining definitions such as "a right
to use that has function or purpose," "[a] service that is readily accessible
[and] promptly and easily obtained," and something that is "convenient or
conducive" to performing a job.185 Without settling on one particular defi-
nition, the court concluded that a determination regarding whether Rule 120
deprived blind persons of meaningful access to the courts would require a
complete factual record and denied the defendant's motion to dismiss.1
86
181 See id. at *10 (describing the way in which the DAS assisted some of its clients).
182 Id. at* 11.
183 See id. at *12.
184 No. CIV.A. 93-5892, 1994 WL 423856, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 1994) (citing PHILA.
MtN. CT. R. Cv. P. 120).
185 Id. at *3 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
186 See id. at *4.
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Nevertheless, the court at least implicitly recognized that meaningful access
requires more than the mere presence of access.
Another district court reached a similar conclusion in Oconomowoc
Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of Greenfield.87 In Oconomowoc, de-
velopmentally disabled persons seeking to live in group homes claimed that
a zoning ordinance prohibiting the location of two group homes within 2500
feet of each other violated the ADA. 188 The Court agreed, reasoning that as
a remedial law, the ADA should be "construed broadly to ensure that dis-
abled people are not denied meaningful access to housing or to public serv-
ices or accommodations."' 89  Despite the fact that the disabled persons
could have stayed in homes that were more spread out, the court found that
the "spacing requirement substantially limits meaningful access to hous-
ing." 190 Nevertheless, Oconomowoc is a little ambiguous in its use of the
term "meaningful access." The court held that the restriction limited
meaningful access, rather than just "access," but the court found a violation
of the ADA when access clearly would have been less readily available to
the disabled, suggesting a standard similar to that put forth in Nix.
5. Meaningful Access if No Particular Exclusionary Effect
The clearest part of the Alexander v. Choate meaningful access analy-
sis, whether the challenged regulation results in a particular exclusionary
effect, is used occasionally by courts to make their determinations of
meaningful access. In Thrope v. Ohio, for instance, a district court consid-
ered a challenge to a $5.00 fee that the state charged for handicapped park-
ing windshield placards. 91 The court granted summary judgment for the
plaintiffs, concluding that the fee was "an illegal surcharge under the
ADA. 192 The State argued that the fee was permissible, because disabled
persons had the option of getting a handicapped license plate instead, at no
cost.193 The court rejected this argument because in order to obtain special
license plates, one would have to own or lease a vehicle, and not all disabled
drivers owned or leased cars. "The license plate 'option' alone provides
187 23 F. Supp. 2d 941 (E.D. Wis. 1998).
188 See id. at 943 (describing the plaintiffs' cause of action). The plaintiffs also brought a
claim under the Federal Fair Housing Amendment Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(l)-(f)(3)(B)
(1994) (forbidding discrimination in housing against disabled persons).
189 Oconomowoc, 23 F. Supp.2d at 954.
190 Id.
191 19 F. Supp.2d 816, 818 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
192 Id. at 824.
193 See id. (citing the State's contention that the placards are "only one alternative avail-
able to disabled Ohio drivers to permit them to utilize-handicapped-reserved parking spaces").
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meaningful access to only a subset of disabled Ohioans (those who drive
their own cars 100% of the time), and is thus at odds with the ADA."'194
The Thrope analysis is notable because it, unlike the majority of other
meaningful access analyses discussed in this Subpart, utilized one of the
factors cited by the Choate Court-a particular exclusionary effect on the
disabled. In Choate, the Supreme Court concluded that when 95% of the
disabled Medicaid patients would probably be fully covered under the
state's revised health care plan, there was no particular exclusionary ef-
fect.195 But, the Choate Court failed to provide guidelines that were any
more specific-where 95% of the plaintiffs are covered, there is meaningful
access, but what about 94% or 93%? Unfortunately, Thrope did not help to
clear up this ambiguity. The court cites no statistics as to how many dis-
abled persons neither owned nor leased cars but still needed handicapped
placards. If one assumes that the percentage is small, the Thrope holding
becomes stronger, as a deprivation of access to a small portion of the group
would constitute a lack of meaningful access.
6. Lack of Meaningful Access forDifficulty or Extreme Inadequacy
Moving even further along the spectrum from "readily accessible," an-
other court has suggested that there is a deprivation of meaningful access
when the benefit in question is too difficult to obtain or extremely inade-
quate. In Bonner v. Lewis, a deaf and mute inmate at the Arizona state
prison sued under the Rehabilitation Act when the prison failed to provide
him with a sign language interpreter. 196 As a result, he found it extremely
hard to communicate in counseling sessions, in administrative and discipli-
nary hearings, and while receiving medical treatment. 19 7 The prison pro-
vided a telecommunication device so that the prison officials could commu-
nicate with the plaintiff, and some of the other inmates had a limited
knowledge of sign language.1 8 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit found that
the factual question whether the communication was "extremely difficult
and inadequate" was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact, and
reversed the district court's summary judgment decision for the defen-
dant.199 This suggests a significantly more probing analysis of meaningful
access than in the prior cases.
194 Id. at 825.
195 See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303 (1985).
196 857 F.2d 559, 560-61 (9th Cir. 1988).
197 See id.
198 See id.
199 See id. at 563-64.
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7. Meaningful Access as Adequate Access
At the far end of the spectrum is World Insurance Co. v. Branch, where
the Northern District of Georgia implicitly suggested that there was a viola-
tion of meaningful access when access was inadequate.2 °0 In Branch, Ralph
Branch, a person with AIDS, challenged his health insurance company's
$5000 lifetime cap on AIDS benefits. In granting summary judgment for
Branch, the court reasoned that "[b]ecause access to adequate health care is
often integral to a disabled individual's ability to participate in society, the
court cannot imagine that an insurer could arbitrarily cap the benefits pay-
able with respect to a particular disability without running afoul of this
stated purpose." 20 1 The court did not specifically state that in order to have
meaningful access, one must have adequate access; rather, it used the fact
that there was inadequate access to explain why the safe harbor provision
did not apply.202 Nevertheless, the court granted summary judgment for
Branch, so there must have been a violation of meaningful access. It would
make little sense to assert that an insurance company could not provide "in-
adequate" access under the safe harbor provision, but then to reason that it
could under the meaningful access test. Such a reading, however, flies in
the face of Choate, and this case remains isolated.
B. Methods Courts Have Used to Avoid the Question Altogether
Beyond the considerable ambiguity in the term "meaningful access,"
courts have added to the complexity of the determination by deciding cases
on other grounds. In addition to the threshold problems in bringing a cause
of action addressed in Part III, federal courts have declined to permit suits in
cases where the benefits at issue are "special" programs or where the chal-
lenged regulation is facially neutral. Facial neutrality is not included in the
above discussion of interpretations of meaningful access, despite being a
factor in the Choate court's analysis, because when courts have addressed it
as an issue, they have used it to avoid examining whether meaningful access
in fact exists.
200 966 F. Supp. 1203, 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1997), a fd in part, vacated in part, 156 F.3d
1142 (1 1th Cir. 1998). Subsequent to the district court's decision, the health insurer rescinded
its policy, so the Eleventh Circuit vacated the portion of the opinion dealing with its validity
under the ADA as moot. See 156 F.3d at 1143.
201 Branch, 966 F. Supp. at 1208.
202 See id. at 1209 ("IT]here is no evidence explaining the purpose for which plaintiff
caps an insured's lifetime benefits for AIDS at $5000.").
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1. "Special" Programs
When courts have found that a benefit program provided by the state is
a "special" program, not available to the general public, they have generally
declined to permit suits under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. For in-
stance, in Lincoln CERCPAC v. Health & Hospital Corp., a district court
granted a motion to dismiss a suit brought by disabled children when the
State closed the New York rehabilitation clinic that they attended.20 3 The
clinic provided specialized services for developmentally disabled children,
and after its closing, no equivalent facility was available to provide these
services.204 Citing Choate's holding that the state was not required to pro-
vide "adequate health care,"205 the court concluded that the clinic's pro-
grams were "specialized services to disabled individuals and not the public
at large," and thus, there was no requirement under the Rehabilitation Act or
206the ADA to continue them. Exactly what made these services "special-
ized," however, is unclear. Under this same rationale, a court could pre-
clude Medicaid patients from ever bringing suit because the government
does not provide Medicaid to the public at large, but rather a very small
subset. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's hold-
ing.
207
A similar argument arose in the context of retirement benefits in Felde
208v. City of San Jose. In Felde, a disabled firefighter challenged the city's
retirement policy, which awarded a 100% payment for accrued sick leave
time to those retiring on a regular-service basis, but only 80% to those re-
tiring on the basis of a disability.209 The court found no ADA violation, be-
cause the plaintiff could have chosen the normal retirement provisions, if he
203 977 F. Supp. 274, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), arfd, 147 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 1998).
204 See id. at 277-78 (detailing the plaintiff's allegations that there are no alternative
healthcare providers in the area who provide "the same quality and quantity of services").
205 Id. at 279 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 309 (1984)) (internal quotation
omitted).
206 Id. at 279-80.
207 See 147 F.3d at 168. Notably, the Second Circuit did not hold that the district court
was correct in its finding that the state had no obligation to provide specialized programs.
Instead, the court rested its decision on the plaintiffs' failure to raise the allegation that they
were entitled to special services which the State denied them. See id. ("We need not decide
whether, in some circumstances, a reasonable accommodation in the provision of medical care
to a disabled person equal to that provided to a nondisabled person might have to include
medical services that could be characterized as 'specialized."').
208 839 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affd, 66 F.3d 335, No. 94-15272, 1995 WL
547698 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision).
209 See id. at 709 ("It is undisputed that ... [the] plaintiff received a proportionally
smaller payout for unused sick leave when he retired on a disability basis than similarly-
situated individuals who did not retire on a disability basis.").
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had given up tax deductions provided for disabled persons. Instead, the
court reasoned that allowing the firefighter to retire as "disabled" was a spe-
cialized service, and so the ADA provided no protection: "In reality, plain-
tiff is seeking special rather than simply nondiscriminatory treatment. The
City's failure to provide him with such special treatment does not violate the
ADA."210 By concluding that the plaintiffs ability to claim eligibility for
tax benefits was special treatment by the city, the court never had to reach
the issue regarding whether the city had deprived him of meaningful access.
Recently, however, the Eleventh Circuit reached a different conclusion
about "special" services. In L.C. ex rel. Zimring v. Olmstead, the circuit
court found that the state could not confine a disabled person in a state-run
institution where the plaintiff could be more appropriately treated in an in-
tegrated community setting.21 1 The plaintiff had been confined in a state
psychiatric hospital where persons with mental disabilities were "cared for
in a segregated environment." 212 In ruling that the state violated the ADA
by keeping the plaintiff in the segregated setting, the court recognized:
The fact that L.C.... seek[s] community-based treatment services that only
disabled persons need does not foreclose [her] claim that [she was] unneces-
sarily segregated.... Underlying the ADA's prohibitions is the notion that in-
dividuals with disabilities must be accorded reasonable accommodations not
offered to other persons in order to ensure that individuals with disabilities
enjoy "equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and eco-
nomic self-sufficiency."
213
Under this reasoning, the "special" services exception ceases to be an
issue. The Eleventh Circuit decided Olmstead on April 8, 1998. It remains
to be seen whether other jurisdictions will follow its example.
2. Facially Neutral Regulations
Another threshold inquiry that courts conduct is whether a regulation is
"facially neutral." As discussed in Part IV, this analysis is problematic be-
cause the Choate Court itself conducted a somewhat circular analysis.
214
The test is also troublesome because under the ADA, disparate impact
causes of action should allow for relief even when a regulation is facially
210 Id. at 711.
211 138 F.3d 893, 895 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 633 (1998); see also supra
note 101 (discussing the Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari in Olmstead).
212 Id.
213 Id. at 899 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (1994)).
214 See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text (describing the Choate Court's analy-
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neutral .2 5 Nevertheless, several courts have dismissed claims challenging
facially neutral regulations. For instance, in DeBord v. Board of Education,
the Eighth Circuit found that a school board did not deprive a student of
meaningful access when its policy was facially neutral.216 In DeBord, the
school board refused to administer a prescription drug to a student with at-
tention deficit hyperactivity disorder because the amount the doctor pre-
scribed exceeded the recommended dosage in the Physicians' Desk Refer-
ence.2 17  Despite the facts that the student's prescription was medically
necessary and that the refusal by the school board to administer the pre-
scription likely would mean that the student would have to leave school
early in order to get the medication at home, the court found that there was
no violation of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. 21  Instead, because the
regulation applied to all students, whether disabled or not, the court found
the regulation to be nondiscriminatory. 219 The court looked to the form of
the regulation, rather than to the effect, and thus never reached the issue of
meaningful access.
Fortunately, other courts have refrained from employing this type of
circular reasoning. For instance, in Peoples v. Nix, a blind plaintiff made a
challenge to the Pennsylvania state court rule requiring attorneys to appear
for all proceedings although the rule appeared reasonable "on its face."
220
The court reasoned that under a disparate impact analysis, the plaintiff may
have had a viable challenge to the state's policies based on the effect of the
regulation.
221
215 See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text (noting that Congress intended a dispa-
rate impact cause of action without envisioning a requirement of complete equality of out-
corm)
26 126 F.3d 1102, 1106 (8th Cir. 1997).
217 See id. at 1104.
218 See id. at 1106.
219 See id. at 1105 ("There is no evidence that the school district had disabilities in mind
when formulating or implementing its policy.... The policy is neutral; it applies to all stu-
dents regardless of disability. A student's excess prescription, not the student's disability,
prevents the student from receiving medication from the school nurse.").
220 No. CIV. A. 93-5892, 1994 WL 423856 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 1994); see also supra
notes 184-86 and accompanying text (discussing the court's construction of "meaningful ac-
cess" in Peoples v. Nix).
221 See Niv, 1994 WL 423856, at *3 ("A showing of discriminatory intent is not neces-
sary to sustain a claim of violation of the ADA.").
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VI. SUGGESTION FOR AN IMPROVED DEFINITION OF "MEANINGFUL
ACCESS" AND A BROADER APPLICATION OF THE ADA
AND THE REHABILITATION ACT
Given the current political drive to reduce government spending and its
222resulting limitations on Medicaid, without a corresponding expansive
reading of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and a true requirement of the
provision of "meaningful access" to health care, disabled persons will face
denials of care and have little recourse.223  Both the movement toward
Medicaid managed care and the drive to cut Medicaid spending limit the
potential of the political process to redress the harms that disabled persons
suffer. Programs like HealthChoices in Pennsylvania will have severe con-
sequences as patients lose their choice of doctors and their health will be
compromised as they are denied care in order to meet a budget. Judicial
interpretations of the disability statutes must be expansive enough to pro-
vide a solution.
If one of the purposes of the ADA is legitimately "to bring individuals
with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of American
life,, 224 then courts must employ a definition of "meaningful access" that
approaches adequate access. It may be that most courts will be reluctant to
go as far as the Branch court, 225 but even a "readily accessible" standard,
such as the Peoples v. Nix2 26 and Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc.
v. City of Greenfield227 courts utilized, would provide more protection to the
disabled. Cases like Anderson v. Department of Public Welfare228 demon-
strate the need for a legal remedy; for an MCO to assign a patient in a
wheelchair to a dentist on the second floor of a building without elevators is
222 See Sparer, supra note 2, at 3 (describing Medicaid and the opposition that has formed
against it).
= This is not to say that the disabled have no recourse; for instance, states must also
comply with the requirements of the Social Security Act. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
301 (1980) (stating that once a state elects to participate in the Medicaid program, it must
comply with the requirements of the Social Security Act). The ADA, however, is the more
comprehensive statute for the disabled, as it was enacted specifically for the sake of the dis-
abled.
224 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 99 (1990).
225 World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203, 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (suggesting im-
plicitly that absent adequate access, there is a lack of meaningful access), a ffd in part, va-
cated inpart, 156 F.3d 1142 (1 1th Cir. 1998); see also supra notes 200-02 and accompanying
text.
226 1994 WL 423856, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 1994); see also supra notes 184-86 and
accompanying text.
23 F. Supp. 2d 941 (E.D. Wis. 1998); see also supra notes 187-90 and accompanying
text.
228 1 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
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unconscionable. But even less extreme cases require redress, and a broader
requirement of meaningful access under the ADA could provide that re-
dress.
Courts also must consistently recognize a disparate impact cause of ac-
tion; otherwise the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act will become toothless in
the health care context. Although invidious discrimination against the dis-
abled remains an unfortunate reality of American culture, particularly
among persons with HIV and AIDS, a far more pervasive problem is the
"benign neglect" caused by regulations that have a disparate impact on the
disabled. The Choate Court recognized the harm caused by disparate im-
pact discrimination, but then issued a holding that did nothing to combat the
problem. If, as the Court asserted, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
"make[s] actionable the disparate impact challenged in this case," and if it
was Congress's intent to combat discrimination that was "the product, not of
invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference-of benign
neglect,''229 then the inescapable conclusion is that the courts should inter-
pret the statutes to prohibit disparate impact discrimination to the fullest
extent possible.
A more consistent recognition of a disparate impact cause of action will
help satisfy the mandate of the ADA. There are obviously situations where
disparate impact is not actionable, such as when criteria are used that "are
necessary for the operation of the program." 230 On the other hand, not every
classification will be vital to Medicaid's continued existence, and the ADA
itself proscribes discrimination that "tend[s] to screen out an individual with
a disability."231 As one commentator notes, "[d]isparate impact discrimina-
tion occurs when a policy that is facially neutral with respect to a particular
group nevertheless affects members of that group differently from oth-
ers. 2 32 It is completely circular reasoning, then, to assert that a policy is
nondiscriminatory because it is facially neutral, as the Choate Court does.
As it stands, the holding of Choate provides little guidance for a court
evaluating an ADA or Rehabilitation Act claim. Although its balancing test
provides a logical starting point, the lack of guidance on the definition of
"meaningful access" permits courts to arrive at virtually any conclusion in
Medicaid cases. The wide spectrum of holdings on meaningful access dem-
onstrates this clearly. In order for the law to have any consistency, courts
should employ a uniform standard of meaningful access that is more in line
with the goals of the two acts.
229 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 294-95 (1985).
230 Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 58 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1993)).
231 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (1994).
232 Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 57 n.44.
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Medicaid is an expensive program, and significant political forces have
tried to cut it back since its inception.23 This is not, however, ajustification
for discrimination against the disabled. As the Eleventh Circuit recently
noted, "[I]nadequate state appropriations do not excuse noncompliance with
federal law. Having chosen to provide services to individuals with disabili-
ties, the State... must act in a manner that comports with the requirements
of the ADA. 2 3 4 Given the recognition that much of the discrimination
against disabled individuals is noninvidious, financial motives for discrimi-
nation cannot be discounted. When a building owner renovates but does not
want to install a ramp, chances are it is not because of any deeply felt hatred
for persons in wheelchairs; it is because the ramp will cost the building
owner thousands of dollars. Nevertheless, the ADA requires that she install
235the ramp. Similarly, the financial justifications of health care providers,
even where legitimate, cannot exclude them per se from compliance with
the ADA. A political commitment to place disabled persons in the eco-
nomic and social mainstream of American life requires a financial commit-
ment as well.
Further, given that one of the ADA's purposes is "to provide clear,
strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against
individuals with disabilities, '236 courts should not interpret the ADA to en-
act further barriers at the threshold. The holdings of the Parker II and Pap-
pas courts, concluding that insurance companies are not "public accommo-
dations," are needlessly narrow readings of the statute."3 7 As the Carparts
court reasoned, if a travel agency is a public accommodation, then how is an
233 See supra notes 1-16 and accompanying text.
234 L.C. ex rel. Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 904 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations and
internal quotations omitted), cert. granted, 119 S. CL 633 (1998); see also Doe v. Chiles, 136
F.3d 709, 722 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that inadequate state appropriations do not excuse
noncompliance with the Medicaid Act); Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Cook, 109
F.3d 693, 704 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that budgetary constraints may be a factor to be con-
sidered by a state when amending or implementing a plan, but that budgetary complaints
alone can never be a sufficient reason for noncompliance); Alabama Nursing Home Ass'n v.
Harris, 617 F.2d 388, 396 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that once a state has voluntarily elected to
particiate in the Medicaid program the state must comply with federal standards).
23 See 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(2) (1994) (requiring that public accommodations which
conduct renovations make the property "readily accessible to and usable by individuals with
disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs").
236 Id. § 12101(b)(2).
237 Parker 11, 121 F.3d 1006, 1011 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (concluding that when there
is no "nexus" to a physical place, there is no public accommodation); Pappas v. Bethesda
Hosp. Ass'n, 861 F. Supp. 616, 620 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (holding that Title III of the ADA ap-
plies only to the physical use of a place); see also supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text
(discussing Pappas); supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text (discussing the Parker deci-
sions).
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insurance company not one as well?238 Likewise, if the ADA covers "goods
and services" of a public accommodation, why is physical entry onto the
premises necessary?239 And, as the Kotev court observed, why would insur-
ance companies need the safe harbor provision under Title III if the Title
was inapplicable to insurance companies?240 Similarly, the state should not
be able to escape responsibility for discriminatory practices against the dis-
abled by contracting out its health care responsibilities,241 or Title II would
become a meaningless provision.
242
The "specialized programs" arguments that the courts adopted in Lin-
coln CERCPAC243 and Felde44 contravene the purposes of the ADA and
the Rehabilitation Act and should be abandoned. It is certainly not the case
that all programs must be continued, but the discontinuance of the program
in Lincoln CERCPAC singled out a specific group of disabilities for non-
coverage, when no alternative programs were available. The Felde deci-
sion, in turn, presented an absurd concept of "choice." If the plaintiff had
"chosen" to accept the normal retirement provisions, he would have been
ineligible for tax benefits-benefits that the government deemed necessary
for disabled persons in order to put them on more equal footing in compari-
son to the nondisabled. 4  Mandating that he "choose" to give up his tax
238 See Carparts Distribution Cir., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12, 19
(lst Cir. 1994) (concluding that the inclusion of travel agencies as "public accommodations"
suggests that "Congress clearly contemplated that 'service establishments' include providers
of services which do not require a person to physically enter an actual physical structure"); see
also supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text (discussing the Carparts court's rejection of
the physical structure requirement and conclusion that a health plan is a public accommoda-
tion).
239 See Parker 1, 99 F.3d 181, 188 (6th Cir. 1996) ("To say that the [ADA] prohibits dis-
crimination only as to 'physical access' to places of 'public accommodation' would write the
terms 'goods' and 'services' out of the statute."), rev'den banc, Parker H, 121 F.3d 1006 (6th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998).
240 See Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316, 1322 (C.D. Cal. 1996);
supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text (discussing Kotev).
241 See supra note 103 and accompanying text (citing J.K. v. Dillenberg, 836 F. Supp.
694, 699 (D. Ariz. 1993), which held that a state cannot disclaim liability by contracting away
its obligations).
242 See supra Part Il.A (tracing the requirements of Title II of the ADA).
243 Lincoln CERCPAC v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 977 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding
that the transfer of disabled children after the closing of a specialized hospital did not state a
claim for violation of the Rehabilitation Act), aff'd, 147 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 1997); see also su-
pra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
244 Felde v. City of San Jose, 839 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affd, 66 F.3d 335 (9th
Cir. 1995) (holding that a city's policy of paying only part of accrued sick time to firefighters
who retired on a disabled basis, but paying in full to firefighters who retired on a nondisabled
basis, did not violate the ADA); see also supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
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deductions in order to receive full retirement benefits is like asking a blind
person to choose to give up a seeing eye dog.
The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act have the potential to safeguard the
rights and improve the quality of life of thousands of disabled persons. A
narrow interpretation, however, will mean that this potential remains only a
potential. Choate's basic holding, that a blanket cap on health care is not a
deprivation of meaningful access, has been repeatedly upheld by courts,
246
but this holding overlooks the fact that treating the disabled and nondisabled
exactly alike will not result in the same benefits for the two groups; other-
wise, there would be no need for a Rehabilitation Act or an ADA. As David
Orentlicher observed, "If we treat people in exactly the same way there will
be greater hardship on some persons than on others." 247 Yet even if a blan-
ket cap on benefits is not redressable, the unsettled nature of the definition
of "meaningful access" leaves open the possibility of employing the two
acts to redress some of the harms that managed care causes Medicaid recipi-
ents. If Congress truly enacted the ADA to combat the deficiencies of the
Rehabilitation Act, as the Senate and the Third Circuit have noted, then
courts should be able to expand on the holding of Choate. 248 A broad read-
ing of meaningful access would accomplish this.
246 See, e.g., Parker II, 121 F.3d 1006, 1008 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that an
employer did not violate the ADA by providing a long-term disability plan that contained
longer benefits for employees who became disabled due to physical illness than for those who
became disabled due to mental illness); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1043 (7th Cir.
1996) (holding that a two-year limit on mental health benefits in a long-term disability plan
did not violate the ADA); Moddemo v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding
a lifetime cap on mental health benefits under the Foreign Service Health Plan); see also su-
pra note 155 (discussing King).
247 Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 77. Orentlicher further explains:
As the Supreme Court has observed, "[s]ometimes the greatest discrimination can lie
in treating things that are different as though they were exactly the same." For ex-
ample, if all persons are denied leave for pregnancy, women suffer greater harm than
men.
Consider another example involving two patients with appendicitis. One patient is
otherwise healthy and will be ready for discharge from the hospital within five days
of the appendectomy. The second patient has a coexisting medical problem (for ex-
ample, diabetes) that causes recovery from the surgery to take ten days. If a health
plan limited reimbursement across the board to seven days of hospitalization after
surgery, the people with coexisting medical problems would be disadvantaged.
Sometimes we need to take people's differences into account when deciding how
to treat them. To ensure that people are treated as equals, it is often necessary to
treat people differently.
Id. at 77-78 (footnotes omitted).
248 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (discussing the shortcomings of the
Rehabilitation Act and Congress's intent to solve them with the ADA). Admittedly, this ar-
gument is more difficult to make with Title II, since Congress specifically chose to follow
Choate's holding. "In the legislative history of [T]itle II, the congressional committees held
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CONCLUSION
In recent years, the nationwide move to managed care has put the health
of Medicaid recipients in the hands of companies that make every effort to
reduce the amount of medical care. Programs like HealthChoices in Penn-
sylvania have resulted in, and continue to result in, reductions in quality and
quantity of care. This has a disproportionate effect on the disabled.
The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act offer much needed protection for
the rights of the disabled, particularly in the context of Medicaid managed
care. The ADA, in particular, has as its stated purposes the elimination of
discrimination against the disabled and the placement of the disabled in the
political and economic mainstream of American life. As a means for ad-
dressing discrimination in health care, Medicaid managed care recipients
have potential remedies under either Title II of the ADA or section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act (both dealing with public services), or Title III of the
ADA (public accommodations).
In promulgating these two acts, Congress recognized that much of the
discrimination faced by the disabled is not just from invidious intent, but
from benign neglect. In Alexander v. Choate, the Supreme Court estab-
lished the analysis regarding whether "meaningful access" to a benefit exists
as the central inquiry in noninvidious discrimination cases. How to make
that determination, however, is unclear, and courts have produced a wide
spectrum of cases interpreting meaningful access, ranging from any access
to adequate access.
The broad range of decisions on meaningful access is indicative of the
need for judicial recognition that the ADA requires the provision of mean-
ingful access, where "meaningful" signifies more than just "basic" or "ru-
dimentary" access and approaches something closer to "adequate" access.
Particularly in light of the need for experimental treatments for persons with
AIDS and HIV, a less firm resolve will have disastrous consequences. And,
if only the most basic, rudimentary access is mandated, how does the ADA
or the Rehabilitation Act put the disabled in the economic mainstream of
society?
Reducing disparate impact discrimination is vital to providing meaning-
ful access to health care to the disabled and is a stated goal of the ADA and
the Rehabilitation Act. Courts should properly enforce the acts.
out Choate as the definitive interpretation of section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] that it
intended mitle II to copy." Weber, supra note 18, at 1115 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.
2, at 84 (1990)). Nevertheless, given that Choate has not produced a coherent set of guide-
lines, it is not unreasonable to suggest that courts employ a consistent definition of "meaning-
ful access" that is more in line with the purposes of the ADA.
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